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The study analyzes the problems associated with the activa-
tion of a substantial number of ships from the National Defense
Reserve Fleet (NDRF) , this country's sole source of reserve
shipping. After a review of past NDRF contributions, a discus-
sion of its present capability is presented. Five major areas
which would serve to constrain future activation efforts are
then examined, including fleet material condition and drydock
availability. Next, these areas are analyzed in the context of
a non-mobilization scenario in an attempt to determine the re-
sponse capability of the NDRF. In the final chapter, conclusions
are drawn regarding the NDRF ' s ability to respond to a fast-
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The capability of the United States to provide adequate
reserve shipping to support the rapid deployment of U.S. forces
in the event of a limited war in the 1980' s is in serious ques-
tion.
The National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) , comprised mostly
of World War II surplus Victory ships, is relied upon by the
Department of Defense (DOD) to provide the bulk of any required
supplemental shipping in a contingency situation. In the past,
this fleet has been most responsive to defense needs and has
proven its value perhaps to a much greater degree than origin-
ally envisioned. However, in the 1980 's, these Victory ships
will be of extraordinary, perhaps unprecedented, age. Irrespec-
tive of actual operating years, the essential soundness and
ability of these ships to respond to an emergency call-up is a
matter of particular concern.
Against this background, the primary objectives of this
thesis are to examine the constraints on reserve fleet activa-
tion and analyze its time-phased capability to respond to a
fast-breaking contingency in the 1980's.
B. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
The purpose of this study is twofold in nature: 1) to
examine the problems associated with the activation of the
NDRF and 2) to determine the extent to which the NDRF can pro-




The questions which have served as a guide in the research
for this study and which provoke significant uncertainty among
sealift planners are listed below:
1) What is the material condition of the ships in the
reserve fleet under the current Maritime Administration
preservation program?
2) How long would it take to break out, drydock, repair,
and refit a reserve Victory ship in an emergency
situation?
3) Would there be enough qualified manpower to man a sub-
stantial number of reserve ships if the need arose?
These questions are examined and answered in Chapters Three
and Four.
C. STATEMENT OF ASSUMPTIONS
It is pertinent before proceeding to discuss the general
assumptions used in the development of this study. They are
listed as follows:
1) It is assumed that policies such as strategic mobility
and strategic deterrence form the basis for sealift
support requirements and that such policies will con-
tinue in the future.
2) It is assumed that the effectiveness of NDRF can be
determined by measuring its ability to provide reserve
shipping in a manner responsive to DOD requirements.
Further, the value of the NDRF lies in its relatively
11

rapid and economic accessability to the National Shipping
Authority when the need arises instead of building new
vessels to meet requirements.
3) It is assumed that having a reserve shipping capacity is
not merely a convenience but an operational necessity.
That is, a withdrawal of commercial shipping for military
use would have an economically adverse impact on private
shipping companies and adoption of such an alternative
would not, therefore, provide a viable reserve shipping
capacity.
D . BACKGROUND
Sealift services are provided for the Department of Defense
(DOD) by the Military Sealift Command (MSC) . As the single man-
ager agency for such services, MSC performs the following four-
fold mission. It -
1) provides sealift capability for deployment and support
of U.S. forces and material in an emergency;
2) develops plans for expansion of sealift capability dur-
ing an emergency or in wartime;
3) provides peacetime logistical support by worldwide sea-
lift of supplies, equipment, and material;
4) provides, mans, and operates ships used for non-trans-
portation purposes such as oceanographic and hydro-
graphic research, support of the space program, and
cable laying and repair. (1:59)
12

With respect to the above mission areas, MSC operates and
maintains a small dry cargo fleet of 27 ships, comprised of 6
government-owned (nucleus) ships and 21 privately-owned (char-
ered) ships. (2:1) Collectively, these ships are known as
the MSC controlled fleet and represent the only organic sealift
capability readily available to provide logistic support to DOD
in a contingency (see Appendix A) . All other assets are subject
to control by the maritime industry or the Department of Com-
merce and are accessible only by invocation of various agency
or contractual commitments
.
Due to MSC's limited organic resources, many sealift plan-
ners have naturally turned to the U.S. Merchant Marine as a
source of contingency shipping in a non-mobilization situation.
In considering this sealift source, the following observations
can be made
:
1) The U.S. flag general cargo fleet is a lean fleet com-
posed of the world's most technologically-advanced ships,
Today, it contains approximately 290 ships, about half
of the 1969 total, and a total well below the 5,000
available at the end of World War II (see Appendix B)
.
(2:25,62;1:59)
Charter ship - A charter ship refers to a privately-owned
ship made available for hire either on a time or voyage or bare
boat basis. In the context of this thesis, charter ship refers
to a U.S. flag dry cargo ship leased by the government for a
specific period of time.
13

2) Of more significance than the general reduction in the
2
number of ships is the fact that the breakbulk ships
ships of high military value due to their self-sustaining
nature - are quietly vanishing from the U.S. flag inven-
tory. The majority of these ships are fast approaching
the age of retirement, are not economically competitive
with newer designs, and are not being replaced. The
150 or so that remain are largely operated by scheduled
carriers. (2:25)
3) A major concern that arises in the increasing dependence
on high-technology ships (container ships, etc.) is the
fact that the sophisticated cargo-handling equipment
necessary to work the ships might not be available when
needed. It is not difficult to imagine any number of
contingencies where this would be the case. (3:32)
4) The viability of the domestic charter market as a source
of sealift is highly dependent upon the economic trends
within the shipping industry. In a contingency situa-
tion, if market demand for shipping is high, MSC will
find it difficult to procure adequate supplemental ship-
ping in a responsive time frame.
At present there are two potential sources of shipping avail-
able to augment the MSC controlled fleet in non-mobilization
contingencies when merchant shipping cannot be chartered. These
are the MSC Sealift Readiness Program (SRP) and the NDRF. Under
2Breakbulk ship - a breakbulk ship refers to a conventional
dry cargo ship with its own gear for loading and unloading cargo.
The general cargo handled by this ship is generally not packaged
in containers but rather stowed piece by piece in the ship's hold.
14

the SRP, merchant shipping companies who wish to move DOD cargo
in peacetime must commit half of their ships to military opera-
tions in the event of a contingency, with specific commitments
time-phased after initial callup (see Appendix C) . (1:48)
Because it is fully operational in peacetime, the SRP fleet
can be marshalled more quickly for non-mobilization contingen-
cies than the NDRF. However, in a contingency of long duration,
with business as usual except in the contingency area, as in the
3Vietnam case, the diversion of berth- line ships from their
regular trade routes would create a vacuum likely to be filled
by foreign-flag carriers. Post-contingency reentry into trade
on these routes would probably be slow and, in some cases, im-
possible. With loss of trade, ships would be dropped, and the
shipping mobilization base for a major war would be further
reduced. (1:49-51)
The NDRF is thus needed to meet military logistic support
requirements in potential long-term non-mobilization contin-
gencies. In some cases it would be possible to charter foreign-
flag ships to meet emergency non-mobilization requirements, but
the foreign-flag fleets may not be a reliable resource, partic-
ularly in emergencies where U.S. policy is not supported by
countries upon which the United States must depend for shipping
assistance. (4:124)
It would be dangerous to underestimate the significance of
the current and future requirement for a national surge shipping
3 ...Berth-lxne ships - merchant ships providing common carrier-
type service with scheduled sailings over definite routes which





reserve. The need is now more critical than at any time since
World War II because the vast reserve of World War II-built ship-
4ping that was in the tramp fleet and the reserve fleet has all
but disappeared.
Up to the end of the Vietnam War, MSC was able to expand
its chartered fleet as necessary without drawing to any great
extent upon ships operated in the regularly scheduled berth-
line trade. Although the MSC controlled fleet could probably
be augmented at any given time by a few underutilized or laid-
up berth-line ships, the 21 ships now in the controlled fleet
comprise the better part of the U.S. dry cargo charter fleet.
Furthermore, since few of the controlled fleet ships are com-
mercially viable, it is probable that most of them will be con-
verted, scrapped, or offered for foreign sale when they are re-
delivered to their owners - if they are not required for the
NDRF.
In short, the excess in the U.S. fleet that was drawn upon
in military and non-military contingencies since World War II
has now dwindled to the small remnant in the current NDRF.
Unless the NDRF is properly maintained, there will be no alter-
native but to draw upon the active berth-line fleet in non-
mobilization emergencies and such an action would severely
degrade that important national asset.
4Tramp (irregular) fleet - that segment of the merchant
fleet which does not adhere to a schedule of sailings, but




In recognition of the necessity of maintaining a reserve
shipping capacity readily available to DOD, the Navy/MSC has
sponsored a series of programs geared at improving its logisti-
cal and sealift capabilities. These programs are generally
referred to under the heading of the Sealift Enhancement Plan
(SEP) . One element of this plan is to provide funds to enable
MSC to maintain underutilized shipping capacity. Controlled
fleet ships that are not needed to meet current requirements
are put in reduced operating status (ROS) . These ships are
maintained in a high state of readiness (crews assigned) and
can be put in operation in three to ten days. The availability
of funds dictates the number that can be maintained in ROS at
any given time (usually five to seven). (5:72,6:14-17)
In addition, the SEP provides funds to enhance the surge
capability of the NDRF. In response to current DOD -planning
that requires supplementary shipping be ready within the first
two weeks of commitment of U.S. forces, the Maritime Administra-
tion and the Navy have established a Ready Reserve Force (RRF)
within the NDRF. Under this program, ships are upgraded and
maintained in a state of readiness so as to provide a dedicated
fleet which can be placed in service within ten days. Unfor-
tunately, this force consists of only 9 ships at present, al-
though there are plans to increase the number to 25 by fiscal
year 1980. (5:72)
Although the RRF is a step in the right direction, it is
only a stop-gap measure. Out of necessity, heavy reliance 'by
17

DOD must still be placed on the NDRF ' s ability to provide
reserve shipping within the time frame dictated. However, the
very existence of the Sealift Enhancement Plan indicates that
there is a growing uneasiness among sealift planners on such
reliance.
E. SUMMARY
In a non-mobilization contingency, the only assets over
which DOD has any reasonable control consist of a small con-
trolled fleet of government-owned and chartered ships, the
RRF/NDRF combination, and the ships in the Sealift Readiness
Program. Of these, the one which is least disruptive to the
U.S. shipping industry and upon which MSC must depend to provide
the bulk of any surge capability is the reserve fleet. Accord-
ingly, the NDRF assumes a critical role in this nation's stra-
tegic mobility. However, heavy reliance upon a fleet of ships
most of which are over 30 years old is questionable and is of
growing concern within DOD.
Against this background, the extent to which the NDRF will
be able to meet future DOD contingency requirements will now be




II. NDRF OPERATIONS: PAST AND PRESENT
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to present basic background
information on the National Defense Reserve Fleet. This informa-
tion will be used as a point of departure in the next chapter to
examine the various constraints on NDRF responsiveness. As a
basis for the examination, it is first necessary to convey a
fundamental understanding of current NDRF status and operations
so that potential complications and problem areas may be fully
appreciated. Also, prior to evaluating future reserve fleet
effectiveness, it will be beneficial to examine the origin and
past contributions of the NDRF to this country's economic and
national security.
B. HISTORY OF THE NDRF
In September 1945, the United States government was the
owner and operator of the largest merchant fleet in the world.
During the eight-year period between 1937 and 1945, approxi-
mately 6,400 merchant ships were constructed under the auspices
of the U.S. Maritime Commission. After accounting for wartime
losses and transfers, at the end of World War II the government
held title to more than 5,000 ships. Upon careful consideration,
the Maritime Commission (forerunner of MARAD) determined that a
structured disposal of surplus ships was a prerequisite to re-
establishing worldwide commerce. (3:27)
The legislation developed to deal with the disposal and
management of the government fleet is the Merchant Ship Sales
19

Act of 1946. The provisions of this act were designed to pro-
vide the following:
1) preference to U.S. citizens under liberal sales terms
toward the purchase of war-built merchant ships;
2) authorization for the Maritime Commission to accept
older American-built and registered ships in exchange
for or as a credit towards newer government-owned ships;
3) sales to foreign nationals under the provision that the
ships sold were not necessary to the defense of the
United States or the promotion of the merchant marine
However, even at "give-away" prices for American and foreign
operators, the Maritime Commission expected that a substantial
number of ships would not be sold. These inactive but poten-
tially useful ships posed a problem. On this basis, the Ship
Sales Act of 1946 was also designed to accommodate the creation
of a government-owned and administered National Defense Reserve
Fleet. (3:28) Specifically, the act states:
The Commission shall place in a National Defense
Reserve (1) such vessels owned by it as, after con-
sultation with the Secretary of War and the Secretary
of the Navy, it deems should be retained for national
defense, and (2) all vessels owned by it on December 31,
1947, for the sale of which a contract has not been made
by that time ... a vessel placed in such reserve shall
in no case be used for commercial operation, except that
any such vessel may be used during any period in which
vessels may be requisitioned under Section 902 of the
Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as amended. (1:52)
Furthermore, the act gave the U.S. Maritime Commission respon-
sibility for the preservation and upkeep of this reserve ship-
ping asset. In July 1946, there were 1,421 ships in the NDRF
at nine anchorages located throughout the United States (James
20

River, Va.; Baltimore, Md.; Hudson River, N.Y.; Wilmington,
N.C.; Beaumont, Tex.; Mobile, Ala.; Astoria, Ore.; Olympia,
Wash.; and Suisun Bay, Calif.). (1:52)
During the period between 1947 and 19 50, the reserve fleet
steadily increased in size. With the postwar demand for ship-
ping subsiding, companies began to return war-built ships, mostly
Liberties, and to place orders for newer, more economical ships
specifically designed for their trade routes. Thus, by July
1950, the NDRF reached its all-time high of 2,277 ships. (3:28)
The 1946 Ship Sales Act did not require that every ship cur-
rently in the NDRF be set aside for indefinite retention. In
fact, it specifically delineated that preservation be considered
for only those ships which had a potential national defense pur-
pose or which could be utilized to augment the merchant marine
during periods of excess shipping demand. In order to clarify
this point, an amendment to the Sales Act was passed in 19 50
which authorized the chartering of NDRF ships in cases where
service was not adequately provided by U.S. private operators
under reasonable conditions and rates. (3:28)
In 1951, the authorization for the sale of reserve ships to
commercial trade operators expired. From that point on, for all
practical purposes ships could be sold only for scrap or for
use in non-transportation roles. (3:28)
The initial test as to the soundness of the concept of
maintaining the merchant fleet in reserve came in 19 50. The
decision by the United States to provide military support to
South Korea posed a sealift problem that the private shipping
21

industry could not quickly meet. The obvious solution was the
reactivation of a select number of ships from the NDRF. The
vehicle used to accommodate the operation, manning, and mainten-
ance of these reserve ships was the General Agency Agreement.
Under the provisions of this agreement, reactivated ships were
operated by private shipping companies but were under the opera-
tional control of the Military Sealift Command (then called the
Military Sea Transportation Service)
.
The shipping companies were given the administrative respon-
sibilities of providing a crew, directing maintenance operations,
and supplying provisions for the NDRF ships in their custody.
The expenses incurred, including overhead costs and set fees to
the companies for services rendered, were borne by the Department
of Defense (DOD) . Additionally, DOD paid the breakout and acti-
vation costs. At the height of the Korean War, about 400 NDRF
ships were utilized to provide logistics support for U.S.
operations . (3:28)
The year 1950 was important for solidifying the NDRF concept.
In the winter of that year, a worldwide shortage of bulk ship-
ping posed a problem U.S. private shipping was unable to over-
come. A primary cause of the shortage was a significant in-
crease in the exportation of U.S. coal to Europe. The 1950-51
winter in northern Europe was the most severe on record. The
cost of shipping coal from the eastern United States to Europe
increased more than threefold ($3.50 per ton in March of 1950
to $13.00 per ton in February of 1951). (3:28)
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In order to drive down freight rates and thus insure that
an inordinate amount of the Marshall Plan Aid would not be lost
to shipping charges, authorization was given for the breakout
of additional shipping assets from the NDRF. Moreover, as soon
as the above situation was under control, another shipping
crisis developed. Massive crop failures in India made it essen-
tial that enormous quantities of grain be shipped immediately to
that country. As before, the only source which could provide
the necessary surge shipping capability was the NDRF. (3:29)
The performance of the NDRF in its first trials as a source
of sealift is summarized in the following excerpt from the 19 51
Annual Report of the Federal Maritime Board/Maritime Administra-
tion:
The increased tonnage, without which it would
have been impossible to meet supply commitments
in Korea and foreign aid commitments elsewhere,
came entirely from the National Defense Reserve
Fleet of the Maritime Administration. Over an
18-month period beginning with Korean hostilities,
778 government-owned ships were withdrawn, repaired,
refitted, and put into service at a rate of more
than three vessels every two days.
By 1953, the need for additional shipping assets had shown
a marked decrease. In January of that year there were only
160 NDRF ships in an active status; the rest had been returned
to their various reserve sites. However, within a few months
the NDRF assumed another unique role in shipping circles, one
that kept it gainfully employed for the next ten years . In
March 1953, the Department of Agriculture submitted a request
which proposed to the Maritime Administration the use of 50
Liberty ships as temporary silos for the storage of surplus grain,
23

The program worked so well that by February 1954 a total of 317
ships were used to store approximately 7 2 million bushels of
grain. By 19 59, the peak of this operation, a total of 400
ships had been utilized to store a reported 136 million bushels.
Although the program was quite successful, it was concluded in
1964 with the release of all grainships by the Department of
Agriculture. (3:29)
In the latter part of 1955, demand for ocean shipping
throughout the world again rose and, as to be expected, there
was an upward trend in associated shipping and charter rates.
A contributing factor was an increase in U.S. overseas ship-
ments of military and foreign aid cargo. This was the world
shipping situation when in July 1956 the Egyptians nationalized
the Suez Canal. The seizure of the canal by Anglo-French forces
precipitated the scuttling of numerous ships by Egyptian authori-
ties and precluded the full use of this vital waterway by inter-
national commerce until April 1957. (3:29)
As a consequence of the "Suez crisis," there was an im-
mediate worldwide demand for additional shipping because the
routes between Europe and the United States on the one hand and
the Persian Gulf on the other had to be extended around the
Cape of Good Hope. In some instances, the total distance
traveled doubled. This had the effect of increasing charter
rates by as much as 300 percent in some cases. As in the
European coal situation of 1951, these exhorbitant shipping
rates placed an additional financial burden on the U.S. Treasury
in terms of various aid programs. In order to reduce costs, and
24

for the second time in four years, the United States was com-
pelled to call upon its reserve merchant shipping asset, the
NDRF. (3:30)
In summary, the 1950 's was a decade in which the NDRF justi-
fied the need for its continued existence beyond doubt. Coal
shipments to Europe, logistic support of U.S. forces during the
Korean War, foreign aid to India in the form of grain shipments,
and increased tonnage demands resulting from closure of the
Suez Canal all testified to the worth of having a merchant
shipping capability in reserve. Additionally, the government
benefitted from the utilization of the NDRF as temporary grain
silos. (3:30)
In 1960, as a result of a joint Navy-MARAD review group,
a determination was reached that numerous ships in the NDRF
no longer warranted preservation for national emergency pur-
poses. These ships, classified as . non-priority , were composed
mostly of Liberty-class vessels and were disposed of by scrap-
ping. The ships selected for retention, a total of 891, were
composed of what was termed Navy-priority ships and MARAD-
priority ships. The former consisted of ships earmarked for
DOD logistical support in a contingency or a national emer-
gency while the latter consisted of ships earmarked to augment
commercial tonnage in times of severe shortages. The two groups
were subdivided further with respect to priority for maintenance
and repair . (3:30)
As the United States entered the 1960 's, the NDRF received
little attention. NDRF preservation funding was given low
25

priority in MARAD budget submissions. If any emphasis was placed
on funding, it was usually confined to the sale of non-retention
ships instead of improving the condition of those selected for
retention. By 1965 the NDRF consisted of 1,594 ships, of which
960 were in the priority retention category. In addition to this
category, 388 Liberty ships were designated as an emergency re-
serve in which limited preservation work was scheduled. (3:30)
If the first half of the 1960 's witnessed the NDRF slide
into ignominity, the second half did not. With the buildup of
U.S. forces in Southeast Asia, it once again became apparent
that the U.S. shipping industry did not have the available assets
to meet both commercial and military requirements. As during
the Korean conflict, the decision was made to reactivate large
numbers of NDRF ships. By June 1966, 105 reserve ships, mostly
Victories, had been withdrawn. From 1965 to 1970, 172 of these
ships moved more than 30 percent of all cargo to Southeast Asia.
(1:54) In November 1970, with the winding down of operations,
the last reserve ship activated for service in Vietnam was re-
turned to inactive status. Once again, the concept of having a
merchant fleet in reserve had proved its worth. However, the
twin strains of age and neglect were apparent. By 1970 it be-
came obvious, as the fleet approached unprecedented age, that
the NDRF concept required a thorough review. (3:30)
The passage of the Merchant Marine Act of 1970 marked a
major attempt by the United States to revitalize its merchant
marine. Although the need for such action was clear with regard
to the future of the NDRF, no unanimity existed with regard to
26

actions to be taken. Opinion at the Washington level was divided
among three basic areas:
1) continuing the existing policy concerning NDRF status;
or
2) upgrading the NDRF; or
3) scrapping the NDRF.
A proponent of the third view, the Maritime Committee of the
AFL-CIO petitioned Congress to recognize the fact that the NDRF
was a part of the past and that to continue to support it would
be a grave mistake. However, when the Merchant Marine Act of
1970 was signed by President Nixon, it was mute with respect to
the future of the reserve fleet. (3:30)
In 1971, under the auspices of DOD, an inter-agency review
was conducted to examine the sources of U.S. sealift. The re-
sult of this review, titled The Sealift Procurement and National
Security Study (SPANS)
, is a comprehensive, four-part analysis
which has proven to be a landmark in terms of assessing sealift
capability. One major recommendation was that the NDRF be up-
dated with used ships from private industry (1950 versions) which
had exceeded their economic life.
MARAD, thinking along the same lines, recommended that ten
used breakbulk ships be purchased outright for mothballing in
the NDRF. The 1972 Department of Commerce Budget contained
$30 million specifically for that purpose. However, the request
was rejected by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) on the
grounds that "the role of the NDRF is clearly military in nature
and determination regarding the need for improving the capability
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of that fleet is a military responsibility." In effect, OMB
asserted that if funds were needed to upgrade the fleet, these
funds should appear in the DOD budget. The following year,
MARAD appealed the decision by OMB but funds were still denied.
(3:31)
Also in 1972, in order to facilitate its own planning and
to more accurately determine the cost, time, and associated
problems in breaking out a priority ship in a contingency situa-
tion, MARAD sponsored the partial reactivation of the SS Greely
Victory. This test indicated that a Victory ship could be re-
fitted in an average of 21 days at a cost of $800,000. (3:31)
,
Although these figures were approximate, the Military Sealift
Command (MSC) took exception to the time estimate and stated it
would take approximately three times as long.
By 1973, the number of reserve fleet sites had been reduced
to three and the MARAD list of retention ships was down to 315;
of these, 130 Victories were classified as priority ships. (3:31)
In 1974, MARAD ' s chief concern turned to the implementation
of the shipbuilding program which the Merchant Marine Act of 1970
had authorized. As a result, it became necessary to reduce the
number of personnel at reserve sites; this made just staying
abreast of the required preservation work a virtual impossibility,
Although MARAD continued to exhibit some interest in the NDRF,
the NDRF was dropping on its list of priorities. For fiscal
year 1975, out of the total MARAD budget request of $586,162,000,
only $4,358,000 was slated for the reserve fleet. This amounted
to less than 1 percent. (3:31)
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On January 2, 1975, President Gerald Ford signed the Mariner
Bill (Public Law 93-605) which, as an amendment to the Merchant
Marine Act of 1936, authorized MARAD to supervise the acquisi-
tion of used Mariner-class ships for lay-up in the NDRF. These
ships, which might otherwise have been scrapped, were to be taken
into the NDRF in exchange for obsolete reserve ships scheduled
for scrapping. The express purpose of this bill was to upgrade
the reserve fleet with relatively newer ships. While the idea
was well considered and long overdue, it was not executed. On
January 2, 1977, the time provision in the Mariner Bill expired
without the exchange of one Mariner-class ship. Probably the
major reason for this lack of success was the fact that most of
the Mariner-class ships were still within their economic life
spans and were able to earn profits. (7:439)
In summarizing the role of the NDRF in the 1960 's and 1970 's,
it can be seen that the "ravages of time, tide, and indifference"
(3:29) have taken their toll. In spite of neglect and reduction
in numbers during the early 1960's, the NDRF proved its concep-
tual viability by providing necessary shipping in support of the
Vietnam conflict. However, during the 1970's the NDRF has shown
signs of its age and obsolescence, factors which prompt consider-
able concern and uncertainty about its future.
C. ADMINISTRATION AND FUNDING OF THE NDRF
As indicated in the previous section, MARAD, an agency of
the Department of Commerce, is charged with the responsibility
of preserving and maintaining the NDRF. Aside from preservation
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duties, MARAD is responsible for administering the sale of
designated reserve ships, is authorized to transfer ships from
reserve sites to any government agency, and is authorized to
release ships to U.S. companies when (U.S. flag) privately-
owned ships are not available for charter.
As reserve fleet administrator, MARAD receives the neces-
sary funding through the annual Maritime Appropriations Auth-
orization Act. Under this bill, the NDRF appears as a line
item along with other expense items such as construction-dif-
ferential subsidies (CDS), operating-differential subsidies,
research and development, and maritime training. For fiscal
year 1978, MARAD requested $5,137,000 to provide for preserva-
tion and security of the ships on its retention list. (7:5)
This sum included the normal preservation maintenance of hulls,
machinery, and electrical equipment along with dehumidification
of ship interiors and cathodic protection of bottoms. Also in
this year's program, additional funding was requested for the
MARAD portion of the joint Navy-MARAD program (Ready Reserve
Force) to improve the activation response time of the NDRF.
(7:9) A survey of MARAD-requested funding for NDRF preserva-
tion for the past six years is provided in Table 1.
D. PRESENT STATUS OF NDRF
With few exceptions, the NDRF has steadily declined in size
over the past 25 years (see Table 2). Since 1958, approximately
2,270 ships have been sold for scrap or non-transportation pur-
poses with the proceeds ($192.2 million) returned to the U.S.
Treasury. (8:65) With this reduction in fleet size came the
30







1972 $4, 318,000 $507,650,000 .85
1973 3,900,000 455,000,000 .85
1974 3.773.000 531.315.000 .71
1975 4,358,000 586,162,000 .70
1976 4,242,000 593.618,000 .72





IJDRF Budget as Part of Total MARAD Budget
*Source« U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce,
Merchant Marine Subcommittee, P/iaritime Appro -




a i yyj, Ships Fiscal Year Shipb
945 5 1962 1862
946 1421 1963 1819
947 1204 1964 1739
948 1675 1965 1594
949 1934 1966 1327
950 2277 1967 1152
951 1767 1968 1062
952 1853 1969 1017
953 1932 1970 1027
954 2067 1971 860
955 2068 1972 673
956 2061 1973 541
957 1889 1974 487
958 2074 1975 419
959 2060 1976 348
960 2000 1977 333
961 1923 I978 (30
Table 2
National Defense Reserve Fleeti 1945-









closing of six of the previous nine reserve sites. Currently,
the ships of the NDRF are divided into three separate fleets
located at Suisun Bay, California; James River, Virginia; and
Beaumont, Texas. Each fleet is under the direction of a re-
gional superintendent and consists of the necessary manpower,
service craft, and equipment to preserve the ships in its care.
However, no assets are designated for any repair maintenance
or upgrading of these ships. Theoretically, such work would be
accomplished at nearby repair facilities and drydocks upon
activation of the ships. (9:6,7) Table 3 indicates the status
of the NDRF as of 30 June 1978. Ships assigned to each fleet
are subdivided into six categories, according to method of
preservation, ownership, and retention plan.
Of the 308 ships currently laid up at the various fleet
sites, only 147 are of general cargo types. (10:.l) The remain-
der are naval auxiliary types and non-retention candidates.
The naval auxiliaries consist of mine-sweepers, tugs, and other
types not appropriate for the transportation of military cargo.
The non-retention group consists of special program ships, i.e.
fish 1 reef program, military assistance programs, ships being
held for spare parts support, and ships being held for scrap.
(11:3)
Of the general cargo ships now in the reserve fleet, 130
are Victory-class ships. These World War II freighters are
driven by steam turbine power plants which enable them to main-
tain speeds between 15 and 17 knots. (11:3) With a lift capa-













I MARAD VICTORIES te 25 59 130
II MARAD OTHER
RETENTION 13 1 1 15**
III NAVY RETENTION 25 13 29 67
IV MARAD SCRAP 13 2 8 23
V NAVY SCRAP - - 1 1
VI MARAD SPECIAL
PROGRAMS «U 7 22 70
TABLE 3
NDRF INVENTORY AS OF JUNE 1978
Sourcei U.S. Department of Commerce, Ships in the National
Defense Reserve Fleet - by Design (10il)
Total does not include SSs Maine and Puerto Rico which
are undergoing RRF Phase I and II
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permanently installed cargo handling equipment, each ship has
the flexibility to provide sealift to almost every overseas
destination. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the basic configuration
and characteristics of the Victory-class ships.
The remaining ships in the general cargo category consist
of 11 Seatrains, 1 container carrier (P-6-SE-PSI) , and 5 Mor-
mac Pride-class ships (C-3-S-33A) . (5:1) The Seatrain ships
were used extensively in Vietnam as an efficient way to trans-
port vehicles and helicopters. (18:65,11:3) The general charac-
teristics and configuration of the Seatrain ships are illustrated
in Figures 3 and 4. The Mormac Pride-class ships, relatively
new additions to the NDRF, were built in the early 1960's and
possess the characteristics of being bigger, faster, and more
suited to current-day sealift requirements. Figures 5 and 6
illustrate the basic characteristics and design of this class
ship. A summary of the ships currently in the NDRF by ship
type, number, and location is given in Appendix D.
E . READY . RESERVE FORCE
A memorandum of agreement between the Department of Com-
merce and the Department of the Navy, signed 2 November 1976,
set forth provisions for the establishment, preservation, and
control of a Ready Reserve Force (RRF) . The purpose of this
new force, an element of the NDRF, was to "... provide a small
number of ships with characteristics particularly desirable
for military use, in a short period of time for a less-than-
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The events which led to the establishment of the RRF began
in early 1976 when MARAD, in its role as reserve fleet adminis-
trator, conducted an analysis of the time required to break out
ships from reserve status. This was prompted by a change in
DOD sealift requirements which specifically stated the neces-
sity of a supplemental shipping capacity within five to ten
days after notification. The result of MARAD ' s examination
indicated that activation of reserve shipping could not be ac-
complished in the specified five to ten-day period nor in a
time frame closely approaching the DOD requirement. The MARAD
activation estimate was 30 to 40 days. (9:1, 11:3,4)
The reasons for this degraded response capability were ex-
cessive age, ships maintained in the same degraded material
condition as when deactivated, lack of NDRF repair and overhaul
equipment, and limited availability of private repair and dry-
dock facilities. The findings were further corroborated by an
independent General Accounting Office (GAO) report, dated
6 October 1976, which reported the results of a review of the
capability of the U.S. fleet to meet contingency requirements.
(13*3-5)
Accordingly, joint action was taken by the Navy and MARAD,
after analyzing various alternatives, to upgrade the immediate
response capability of the NDRF. Based on DOD requirements
and a preliminary feasibility and' cost study, MARAD proposed
that 30 reserve Victory-class ships be overhauled and refitted




1) A preactivation phase (Phase I) which entails 148 work
items ranging from checking keys to placing the main
power plant in operation. This phase would require
40,000 man-hours per ship.
2) A deactivation phase (Phase II) which entails work
required to prepare the ships for return to the reserve
fleet in a ready status upon completion of Phase I dock
work. This phase would require 4,750 man-hours per
ship.
3) An active retention phase (Phase III) which entails work
necessary to preserve and maintain the ships in RRF
status. This phase would require one man-year per ship
per year. Also incorporated in this phase are provis-
ions for an annual test (one ship, no prior notice) to
validate response time.
4) An activation for service phase (Phase IV) which entails
work required to have the ship on berth and ready to
take cargo within the ten days. This phase would re-
quire 9,4 00 man-hours per ship.
The MARAD estimated cost for activating a Victory ship via the
above procedures was approximately $1.5 million per ship. How-
ever, such activation would furnish an operational ship, in
"full class" by American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) standards,
possessing a current Coast Guard certificate of inspection,
fully equipped with all necessary stores and spare parts and
ready for service. (11:5)
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The Navy concurred with the MARAD proposal, with certain
modifications, and requested support funding in its Program
Objective Memorandum (POM) submission for fiscal year 1977. (6:15)
The major modification was that the time-phase buildup of the
RRF, the specific ship mix and type, the total number of ships,
and future changes in the composition of the RRF were to be at
the discretion of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) , in accord-
ance with budget constraints and requirement validations, subject
to agreement by the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Maritime
Affairs. (3:21) In order to formalize the basic understanding
between the Departments of Commerce and the Navy, a memorandum
of agreement was signed.
At the start of fiscal year 1977, the Navy transferred $5.. 2
million to MARAD to fund its share of the joint program. (8:65)
Under the RRF program, the Navy is responsible, on a reimburs-
able basis, for funding the upgrading of the selected ships.
Once the ships are brought up to RRF status , however , MARAD
funds their preservation and continued maintenance. In fiscal
year 1977, seven ships were put into the RRF program, (six at
James River, one at Beaumont). (8:65) Currently, as indicated
in Table 4, the RRF consists of nine ships, two of which were
still in Phase I and II of the program on 30 June 1978. (10:1)
As is also indicated in Table 4, the initial MARAD plan of
utilizing 30 Victory ships was abandoned in favor of a more
versatile ship mix. This change in policy was due to the un-
expected trade-in of five Mormac Pride C-3's and the emphasis
placed by the Army and the Marine Corps on Seatrain utilization.
44

SHIP TYPE NAME LOCATION LIFT CAPACITY**
C3-S-33A Pride James River 13.621
C3-S-33A Bay James River 13.621
C3-S-33A Cove James River 13.621
C3-S-33A Scan James River 13.621




Seatrain Washington Beaumont 19,825
Seatrain Maine Phase I & II 19,825
Seatrain Puerto
Rico
Phase I & II 19,825
Table *f
Ready Reserve Force as of 30 June 1978
Source: MSC Working Paper Memorandum, Sealift Appraisal




The Seatrain, with its wide hatches and unobstructed deck space,
is ideally suited for the transportation of unit equipment.
The current policy is to maintain a ship mix with a lift capa-
city of 340,000 measurement tons (M/T) which is the approximate
equivalent of the lift capacity of 30 Victory ships. (2:24) A
sample ship mix is indicated in Table 5.

















Sample RRF Ship Mix
Source 1 MSC Working Paper Memorandum,
Sealift Appraisal and Program
„ „.. 7 . Considerations ( 2« 2k )Measurement tons '
At present, the future prospects (see Table 6) of the RRF
are dependent on the number of C-4 Mariner-class ships traded
in to the NDRF. By the end of fiscal year 1978 the RRF will
have a minimum strength of 13 ships but it may have as many as
17 due to the increased C-4 turn-in rate that MARAD is experienc-
ing. (14,15) The MARAD C-4 anticipated turn-in rate for fiscal
years 1978 through 1982 is indicated in Table 7.
Unit equipment: Organic equipment which is assigned to an
Army, Navy, or Marine Corps unit, i.e. armored vehicles, trucks,
small artillery, helicopters, M-60 tank, etc.
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FISCAL YEAR '77 '78 '79 •80
Seatrain 2 k 7 9
Victory 1 1 l 1
C-3 5 5 5 k




8 13 19 25
Table 6
Expected RRF Composition, FY 77-FY 80
*Source: MSC , "Development of the Ready
Reserve Force", Background
,
No. 78-9, 1 June 1978
F. NDRF IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURES
Prior to the actual breakout of ships from the NDRF, sev-
eral administrative decisions must be made by cognizant activi-
ties within the Departments of Navy and Commerce to insure ac-
tivation is warranted. The necessary conditions and procedures
for reserve fleet utilization are specified in the following
documents
:
1) Section 11, Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946 and Section
902, Merchant Marine Act of 1936;
2) 1954 Memorandum of Agreement between the Department of
Commerce (DOC) and the Department of Defense (DOD)
,
often referred to as the Wilson-Weeks Agreement; and
3) 1967 Memorandum of Agreement between MSC and MARAD.
(2:15) Sections 11 and 902 of the Merchant Ship Sales
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FISCAL YEAR NUMBER EXPECTED SPECIFIC MARINERS
FY ?8 Export Diplomat
Export Democracy









FY 81 3 Austral Pilgrim
Thomas Jefferson
John Penn
FY 82 3 Lyman Hall
Thomas Lynch
Table 7
MARAD Projection of C-k Mariner Trade-ins, FY 78 - FY 82
*Source« MSC Working Paper Memorandum, Sealift Appraisal
and Program Considerations ( 2 : 24)
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Act of 1946 and the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, res-
pectively, provide the basic authority to withdraw ships
from the NDRF but only under conditions where the threat
of government requisitioning of commercial shipping
exists. The pertinent passage of Section 11 reads in
part:
A vessel placed in such reserve shall in no case
be used for any purpose whatsoever except that
any such vessel may be used for account of any
agency or department of the United States during
any period in which vessels may be requisitioned
under Section 902 of the Merchant Marine Act of
1936, as amended. (16:93)
Additionally, Section 902 stipulates the following:
Whenever the President shall proclaim that the
security of the national defense makes it advis-
able or during a national emergency declared by
proclamation of the President, it shall be lawful
for the commission to requisition ... (16:132)
Thus, a necessary condition prior to activation of the NDRF
is that the threat of requisitioning exists. However, the
authority to requisition can only be granted by the President
when the national security is threatened or when a state of
national emergency is proclaimed.
The Wilson-Weeks Agreement, negotiated approximately 24
years ago, is a long-standing document whose basic purpose was
(and is) to overcome maritime industry fears of government
competition. Its principal features are the recognition of the
need for an MSC controlled fleet (formerly MSTS) and the estab-
lishment of priorities for the acquisition of sealift assets
and services. Specifically it states:
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The Department of Defense and Department of Commerce
agree it is essential that the Department of Defense
have under its exclusive custody, jurisdiction, and
control, at all times, a nucleus fleet of size and
composition to meet current conditions and require-
ments .
All merchant shipping required by the Department of
Defense, in addition to that provided by MSTS nucleus
fleet, will be obtained, consistent with military
requirements and prudent management, in the following
order of priority:
1) maximum utilization of available U.S. flag berth
space;
2) time or voyage charter of suitable privately-
owned U.S. flag merchant ships to the extent
these are voluntarily made available by the
maritime industry. Such time or voyage chart-
ters will be kept to the minimum necessary to
meet requirements which foresight indicates
cannot be met by U.S. flag berth operators;
3) shipping provided by National Shipping Authority
under General Agency Agreement or other arrange-
ment ; or
4) in the event suitable U.S. flag shipping is not
available under conditions stated above, the
Military Sea Transportation Service may employ
foreign flag shipping only to the extent neces-
sary to meet urgent military requirements. (1:67)
In summary, only after the MSC-controlled fleet, U.S. charters,
and berth shipping have been determined to be inadequate in
terms of response time or ship availability, can the NDRF be
activated to provide the necessary capability. (2:15)
Once a decision has been reached to augment sealift with
reserve ships, the subsequent implementation steps are outlined
in the 1967 MSC-MARAD Memo of Agreement as follows:
Upon receipt of an MSC written request for activa-
tion of ships, MARAD will submit to MSC for review
an estimate of the total cost of such activation
based on the best information available having due
regard to the advanced age of the ships. If re-
quired by MSC, the ships will be taken from the
fleet for the purpose of drydocking, opening up,
and performing a complete survey to more accurately
prepare the estimates of cost for activation. All




MSC acceptance of such estimates and a written
citation of funds to MARAD will constitute auth-
ority for MARAD to proceed with the activation
or deactivation.
A summary of the administrative decision process prior to NDRF
activation is illustrated in Figure 7. A cursory examination
of Figure 7 will reveal that one factor in determining NDRF
responsiveness is the time spent by respective agencies (MSC,
MARAD, etc.) in the decision process prior to actual activation.
The basic prerequisites for activation of the NDRF, as dis-
cussed above, also hold true for the RRF with the exception of
the procedures outlined in the 1967 Agreement. In its place,
a separate 1976 Memorandum of Agreement between the Department
of the Navy and the Department of Commerce, covering the RRF
exclusively, sets forth the authority and procedures for activa-
tion. Basically, once the decision to employ reserve assets
has been reached, the authority to initiate an RRF callup rests
with the Commander, Military Sealift Command (COMSC) . Acting
as executive agent for the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
,
COMSC determines the ship mix required and the time frame for
RRF deployment. ^his decision, however, is subject to con-
currence by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations
and Logistics) and the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for
Maritime Affairs. (12:1)
G . SUMMARY
The NDRF, under the care of MARAD, has proven to be a val-
uable asset to this nation on numerous occasions . Through the





Assessment of Controlled Fleet capability
to meet requirement
I
Assessment of berth shipping capability
to meet requirement
Testing of domestic charter market for
availability of new charters
T
Decision process cannot continue toward
NDRF activation without state of national
emergency in effect (if no state of emerg-
ency were in effect at the time of the
contingency, a presidential proclamation
of emergency would allow use of NDRF)
.
T
Decision to request NDRF activation within
the DOD
I
MSC forward activation request to MARAD
Preparation of activation cost estimate
by MARAD
MSC evaluates MARAD activation cost
estimate
MSC provides MARAD with a written
funding citation for activation
MARAD starts actual activation process,
including providing manning and shipyard
availabilities for NDRF ships.
FIGURE 7
'oO'trcn MHC Wo^k i n~ r-ir' , > M^mornndum,
r>-H.1 i ft A.pr:"' ?ind r''' 1"1 ".' >\n i X n r) ;
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needed reserve capacity to logistically support U.S. troops in
two limited wars and to supplement world shipping when short-
ages arose. However, with the coming of the 1970 's, the exces-
sive age of these ships had many sealift planners speculating
as to their future usefulness.
Until an ultimate solution could be devised, MARAD proposed
that a Ready Reserve Force be established within the NDRF. Its
main purpose was to counteract the lengthy activation period of
the aging Victories by providing a small group of general cargo
ships which would be maintained in class, certified, and ready
for immediate callup. Currently, of the 147 ships in the NDRF
which are the nucleus of this nation's sealift capability, only
nine have the potential to be activated in less than ten days.
By fiscal year 1980, it is expected these nine will be expanded
to 25.
The administrative procedures for the activation of the NDRF,
as currently established in Public Law and Memorandum of Agree-
ment, are specifically designed to ensure that there is no
government competition with the maritime industry with regard
to shipping services. Unfortunately, due to the specific




III. EXAMINATION OF THE CONSTRAINTS ON NDRF ACTIVATION
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the major con-
straints which would preclude the timely activation and utiliza-
tion of the NDRF in a less-than-full mobilization environment.
Excessive age, time-consuming repairs, non-availability of spare
parts, crew shortages, are just some of the problem areas which
could potentially hinder a large scale breakout of ships from
the reserve fleet.
As was discussed in the previous chapter, the establishment
of a Ready Reserve Force within the NDRF has done much to in-
sure a sealift capability responsive to a fast-breaking contin-
gency situation. However, this in no way diminishes the role or
importance of the reserve fleet as a source of surge shipping
capacity. In fact, the establishment of a concept such as the
RRF is an admission that the reserve fleet, still a heavily
relied upon asset, is limited in its response capability. Es-
sentially, the RRF, by eliminating many of the constraints on
rapid activation, serves as a stop-gap measure to minimize the
effect on this nation's strategic mobility of a slowly respond-
ing reserve fleet.
Prior to undertaking a discussion of the various aspects
which would serve ' as obstacles to the breakout of a large
number of reserve ships, it will be of advantage to describe
the problems experienced during the Korean and Vietnam activa-
tions. The delays experienced during these operations provide
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a good indication of what can be expected in the future.
B. KOREAN AND VIETNAM ACTIVATION EXPERIENCE
1. Korea : The first activation of the WWII NDRF was in
support of military operations in Korea. From mid-March through
December 1951, the National Shipping Authority (NSA) authorized
the withdrawal of 443 ships from the various reserve sites to
facilitate the return of U.S. liner ships from military support
roles to their peacetime trade routes. The limited amount of
service these reserve ships had experienced during the latter
stages of World War II and their brief layup period in the re-
serve fleet enabled the NSA to place the majority of them on
loading berth within five to seven days. (11:2)
Although a slight amount of repair was necessary during the
reactivation process, in general the hull, machinery, deck gear,
and spare parts on board each reserve ship were adequate for
the task at hand. Replacement parts, if not available within the
reserve fleet itself, were still available from the original
suppliers. (11:2) Considering these factors, the total cost of
bringing 443 reserve ships to operating status was only $60
million, or an average of $135,000 per ship in current dollars.
(9:7)
The major problem that arose during the initial reactiva-
tion process was that with the advent of the Korean conflict,
total seagoing billet requirements took a sharp rise from
57,000 in June 1950 to 87,000 in June 1951. (11:2) This in-
crease of 53 percent over the span of a year made seagoing
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manpower a particularly acute issue and delayed the sailing of
numerous reserve ships. The cyclical employment pattern in-
herent in the merchant marine combined with the high wages and
good job opportunities then existing ashore made it difficult
to recruit experienced seamen. As a result, the reactivation
process was hampered by shortages of skilled personnel, partic-
ularly licensed engineers, radio operators, and able-bodied
seamen. (9:7)
During the second quarter of 1952, the number of reserve
ships in service decreased rapidly to 18 3. As the demand for
additional shipping subsided, these ships were returned to re-
serve fleet sites at an average layup cost of $19,000 per ship.
(9:7)
In summary, it is clear that the relative youth of the NDRF
(average ship age less than ten years) played a vital part in
its speedy reactivation and availability during the' Korean
conflict.
2. Vietnam : Reactivation of ships from the reserve fleet
for Vietnam operations was initiated on 16 July 1965 upon re-
quest by the Department of Defense; specifically, DOD requested
MARAD to activate and place in operation as soon as possible
14 Victory-class ships. By October 1966, 172 reserve ships
had been broken out, repaired, refitted, and assigned to 40
general agents for operation; this constituted 93 percent of
the total number of General Agency Agreement (GAA) ships in
service during military operations in Southeast Asia. (11:2)
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The ships laid up in the reserve fleets had been maintained
during the period between Korea and Vietnam under a program of
contact preservation (i.e. various preservation coatings applied
to the interior and exterior surfaces of the ships) . This pre-
servation method along with a general neglect during the interim
period accounted for most of the problems during initial reactiv-
ation phases. The major problem areas included increased activa-
tion times, reduced ship reliability, increased activation and
repair costs, a shortage of repair yard capability, and crew
shortages. (9:8)
The average activation time for the first 14 ships with-
drawn from the reserve fleet was 21 days. Due to the DOD re-
quest to reduce the time factor involved, shipyard work was
accomplished on an around-the-clock basis, numerous shortcuts
consistent with safety were taken, and sea trials were elimin-
ated (since most ships came from Atlantic and Gulf fleets, the
voyages to the Pacific Coast were used as a shake-down period)
.
However, the average activation time for the next 37 ships with-
drawn was considerably greater — 42 days. This sizable in-
crease was due in part to extended shipyard periods necessitated
by the generally degraded condition of the ships and the cor-
responding greater amount of repair work required to put them
in operation. Another contributing factor to increased res-
ij ponse time was repair yard capability. Although, for the most
part, capability in the United States to repair and reactivate
the required reserve ships in an orderly manner was adequate,
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there were several instances of repair yard backlogs which
delayed ship activations. Table 8 provides activation dates
for the first 101 reserve ships withdrawn for Vietnam service.
In December 1965, due to mounting costs, DOD requested that
further breakout of reserve ships be accomplished on a least-
cost basis. This required that shipyard time be further ex-
tended to eliminate as much overtime and shift differentials
as possible. Thus, as can be seen in Table 8, activation of
over half of the authorized reserve ships, which occurred in
fiscal year 1966, averaged two months per ship, a period which
was considerably longer than initially envisioned. (9:8)
T AVERAGE AVERAGE
ACTIVATION NUMBER DATE PLACED DATE ON AVERAGE DAYS
FLIGHT NO. OF SHIPS IN SHIPYARD BERTH IN SHIPYARD
1 14 7-17-65 8-7-65 21
2 8 8-17-65 9-27-65 41
3 28 8-28-65 10-10-65 43
4 1 10-19-65 11-21-65 31
5 25 12-15-65 2-6-66 53
6 6 2-7-66 4-15-66 67
7 6 3-12-66 5-15-66 64
8 6 4-12-66 6-15-66 64




ACTIVATION PERIODS OF 101 NDRF SHIPS
"•Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Ready Reserve Fleet
Plan 4 2)
Contrary to what was indicated in the previous paragraph,
closely associated with extended shipyard periods were higher
activation costs. The total activation cost through April 1966
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amounted to $33 million (see Figure 8 for cumulative nine-
month activation cost) . The average activation cost was ap-
proximately $421,000 per ship (for the 79 ships activated by
April 1966. Additionally, the average cost for stores, fitting
out, GAA fee, etc., was $70,000 per ship for the same time period.
(17:49-52) Thus, each ship that was broken out for service
cost the government approximately $491,000 through April 1966.
Although this sum seems quite acceptable today, in 1966 it was
a source of considerable concern to both MA RAD and DOD. (18:682)
A summary of monthly activation rates and associated costs
CTuly 1965-April 1966) is presented in Figure 9.
Ship reliability also proved to be of concern, especially
during the initial three months of operation. Of the 51 ships
activated in 1965, approximately 7 percent experienced mech-
anical problems of one form or another resulting in lost time
averaging ten days per ship by 17 March 1966. (9:8) The items
that caused most of the breakdowns and corresponding delays are
indicated in Table 9. Notwithstanding the high percentage of
early breakdowns, over the long run the majority of the re-
activated ships performed in an adequate manner. Based upon
the operating statistics of 68 ships in service from 17 July
1965 to 1 February 1966, out-of-service time amounted to 4.75
percent as compared to about 3.5 percent under normal (regular
berth-line) operations. (9:9)
Aside from delays and out-of-service time due to repairs
and breakdowns, there were also numerous delayed sailings due
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BREAKDOWN AREAS SPECIFIC ITEMS CAUSING DELAYS
Boilers Tubing leaks, bottom blow valve
spool, header, boiler water test-
ing line, soot blower, level indi-
cators
Condensers Tubes leaking
Electrical Systems Turbo generators, emergency diesel
generators, control panels, starting
motors, fan motors
Fresh Water Evaporators Tubing
Pumps Turbine feed pump, fuel oil pump,
feed pump governors, sanitary
pumps, main condensate pump motors,
main circulatory pumps
Main Engines Turbines, reduction gears, throttles
Refrigeration Domestic reefer boxes, main refri-
geration system
Piping Salt water lines
Electronic Systems Radars, radios, echo sounders
Miscellaneous Telemotors, topping lifts, winch
controls, winch armature, lifeboat
winches, anchor windless motors
TABLE 9
MAJOR PROBLEM AREAS CAUSING INITIAL BREAKDOWNS
Ource: U.S. Department of Commerce, Ready Reserve Fleet
Fla 9 ; 9)
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1965 and early 1966 that existed during the beginning of the
Korean War. The large increase in demand for seagoing man-
power far exceeded readily available assets. Table 10 illus-
trates the effect this had on sealift support of Vietnam dur-
ing the years 1966 through 1968. Both MARAD and MSC sponsored
massive recruiting campaigns designed to rapidly build up the
seagoing workforce. Unfortunately, due to the time required
to train qualified personnel and the lack of skills in critical
areas (engineers, deck officers, radiomen) , many ships had to



























TOTAL 1.405 592 42 2,210
TABLE 10
SHIP SAILINGS DELAYED IN VIETNAM
USE DUE TO GREW SHORTAGES
CN0 Report, Sealift Requirements Study, Third
Progress Report
,
pu 36, December I967
As can be surmised from the age of the ships and the num-
ber of early breakdowns, maintenance and repair costs were








LICENSED OFFICERS UNLICENSED ( SKILLED)
Db:CK ENG DECK ENG STWD
1966 JAN 8 - 3 - - -
FEB 27 5 9 - 1 -
MAR 31 6 27 - - -
APR 10 4 10 - - 1
MAY 25 36 35 2 2 -
JUN 22 9 25 - - -
JUL 22 18 35 - 4 1
AUG 28 36 49 11 13 1
SEP 36 32 44 4 14 1
OCT 41 29 33 6 4 -
NOV 4i 26 41 5 8 2
DEC 32 25 35 1 2 -
1967 JAN 46 38 62 3 14 1
FEB 30 22 38 2 1
MAR 50 9 11 2 7 -
APR 59 34 41 4 3 4
MAY 58 23 37 10 12 1




FROM JANUARY i960 TO JUNE 1967
C N R R pert , Seallft Requirements Study, Third
Fro "rr?r,3 Report
,
p~! 34 , December 1967
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associated repair costs experienced by the first 47 GAA ships
to be reactivated and put in service. From 1965 through 1970,
the cost of keeping the reserve ships operating totaled nearly
$85 million, or an average of approximately $445 per voyage
day. A summary of the number of voyage days, total mainten-
ance and repair costs, and average cost per voyage day per ship
for each year during the Vietnam conflict is illustrated in
Table 12. As the data illustrate, the ships were most active in
1967 and 1968, with the total number of sailings declining
rapidly as military activities slowed. Considering the whole
six-year period, the average cost for each NDRF ship can be
broken down as follows: (9:9)
Reactivation $476,937
Maintenance and repair 490,984
Deactivation 4 5,39 2
TOTAL $1,013,313 per ship
In 1970, when the last GAA ship was finally returned to
the reserve fleet, a total of 190,909 voyage days of service
had been provided. Of the 1972 ships reactivated, only 122
were retained for preservation. The rest were scrapped. (9:8)
In summary, although the NDRF performed satisfactorily
during the Vietnam conflict, the material condition and gen-
eral responsiveness of the fleet was far below the standards
that prevailed during the Korean War. This was to be expected
if for no other reason than that the ships had aged during the
interwar period.
Voyage days - the total days spent at sea between ports.




VOYAGE DAYS M & R M & R COST PER
YEAR OPERATION COST VOYAGE DAY
1965 1.697 379.664 223
1966 34,135 15.049,402 441
1967 66,064 30,960,248 468
1968 51.503 21,016,082 408
1969 29,914 15,100,154 505
1970 7.596 2,434,381 320
TOTAL 190,909 $84,940,261 $445 **
TABLE 12
GENERAL AGENCY AGREEMENT VESSEL MAINTENANCE
AND REPAIR COSTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA PROGRAM
**One major U.S. operator indicated this as reasonable for
ships of that age brought into service under emergency-
reactivation procedures. MSC also advised that its
Victory ships operating during the same period experienced
approximately the same average M & R costs per voyage day.




C. MATERIAL CONDITION OF RESERVE SHIPS
As can be surmised from its history, the consideration which
is the most fundamental to activation of the NDRF is the material
condition of the ships themselves. Upon this condition depend
two closely associated areas, cost and responsiveness, each of
which could prove prohibitive to future reserve- fleet utiliza-
tion. Despite the fact that the majority of the ships in the
NDRF have reached an unprecedented age, due to their limited
active service life and major upgrading during Southeast Asia
operations they are considered by many officials to represent
significant future service capability. However, how long these
ships can be maintained, under the present reserve fleet pre-
servation program, in a state conducive to reactivation is an
unknown factor. Excluding the nine ships dedicated to the
RRF, there are now 137 ships (130 Victories, 7 Seatrains) whose
material condition is a source of keen DOD and Congressional
interest. (10:1)
The MARAD preservation program is predicated upon two prin-
ciples: 1) preservation of those ships considered necessary
for retention in the same condition as when last deactivated,
and 2) disposal of those ships considered unnecessary. To keep
abreast of current fleet conditions and to document preserva-
tion efforts, the MARAD regional offices maintain survey and
ship condition records for each ship on their retention lists.
These files contain among other information:
1) American Bureau of Shipping records and requirements;
2) audio gauge readings of the hull steel thickness; and
3) surveys performed by MARAD personnel. (9:1,13)
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Appendix F provides a summary of pertinent data (last drydock
period, outstanding work items, etc.) taken from the above
records on each of the 130 Victory ships presently in the NDRF
.
All ships designated for retention are maintained under
a dehumidification/cathodic protection process which is far
more effective than the contact preservation method. This lat-
ter process, which was used exclusively prior to 1970, consisted
of coating vital machinery and exposed metal surfaces with
special oil, grease, and other contact materials designed to
arrest corrosion.
However, it was discovered during Vietnam reactivation
that these coatings slowly hardened and proved very costly and
time-consuming to remove. (9:14) Dehumidification preserva-
tion, on the other hand, is a method by which certain portions
of the ship's interior are tightly sealed to prevent the entry
of moisture. Specialized equipment is installed to lower the
relative humidity and maintain it within the 3 5 to 4 percent
range. Within this dry atmosphere, corrosion and deteriora-
tion of equipment is severely retarded.
Additionally, the underwater portion of each retention ship
is protected by a unitized cathodic grid through which an elec-
tric current is applied. The electricity passing through the
water to the steel hull renders it inert and highly resistant
to oxidization. (13:4)
According to cognizant MARAD officials, the present preser-
vation program has been highly effective in maintaining reserve
fleet ships in good condition. (19) To substantiate this claim,
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MARAD has often referred to various walk-through surveys con-
ducted by joint MSC/MARAD teams over the past few years. In
general, these survey findings indicated that the dehumidifica-
tion process is efficient and suitable to maintain a ship's
interior envelope in a satisfactory state of preservation. Ad-
ditionally, the electro-cathodic protection system appears to
be giving excellent results insofar as minimizing underwater
hull deterioration. (20:2, 9:14) However, this is not to say
that all 137 retention ships in the NDRF are in a high state of
repair or preservation for such is definitely not the case. It
only means that the preservation program utilized is effective
in maintaining the superstructure, hull, and interior of a
Victory (or Seatrain) class ship in the same condition as when
delivered for layup.
The findings of the 5 April 1976 inspection report on the
material condition of the ships of the James River Fleet indica-
ted that although most major interior and exterior portions of
the surveyed ships were in satisfactory condition, there were
numerous secondary areas open to question. For instance, the
report stated that there was "every reason to believe from ex-
amination that most if not all of the deck electrical wiring
would have to be replaced." (20:2) Also, since present
These surveys, the majority of which were conducted from
December 1975 through April 1976 for the purpose of selecting
30 Victory ships for the RRF, were cursory in nature and gen-
erally did not employ any elaborate destructive/non-destructive
test methods; the utilization of which might have revealed
defects not apparent to the naked eye.
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preservation methods require that major shipboard systems be
disconnected, much of this equipment and machinery had not been
operated or tested in at least eight years and as such its
status was unknown. Additional problem areas that were pointed
out concerned galley and messrooms, crew quarters, electronic
equipment, lifeboats, cargo handling gear, generators, reefers,
flaking paint, and deck deterioration. (20:1-5) The report also
noted for future planning purposes that the majority of these
ships would cost between $1.8 and 2.0 million and require 60
to 70 days in a repair yard (per ship) for reactivation for
emergency use. (20:5)
A similar inspection conducted on 15 April 1976 with the
specific purpose of examining the material condition of the
ten Seatrain ships moored in the James River fleet revealed
that most of these ships had been laid up without repairs
(deactivation was accomplished without even cleaning the boiler
firesides in some cases) . Three of these ships (Georgia,
Delaware, and San Juan) were determined to have little poten-
tial for further use because of their lesser military cargo
8
capability, age, and interferences on deck. The remaining
seven ships were in various states of preservation but were
deemed to have high potential. (21:1-2) The Seatrain Florida,
for example, was judged to be an extremely good prospect for
8These vessels for the most part were not fitted with
cranes (not self-sustaining) , lacked an overhead spardeck,
needed repairs, and had main decks cluttered with container




reactivation but it was in poor condition due to the deteriora-
tion beyond tolerable limits of decks, hull, and topside equip-
ment. (21:9) Additionally, it was estimated that reactivation
cost for the seven ships considered to have breakout potential
would be between $1.5 and 1.8 million per ship (barring any
unanticipated heavy machinery repairs and extensive steel re-
newals) and would take approximately 65 to 70 days. (21:2)
Although the ships in the NDRF are not sinking at their
moorings due to corrosion and deterioration, neither are they
being maintained in a state conducive to rapid and economical
reactivation. The primary reason for this is MARAD ' s preserva-
tion program. This is evidenced by a noticeable lack of facili-
ties, equipment, and personnel to perform even minor repair work
to maintain reserve fleet ships. Essentially, once a ship is
deactivated, laid up, and the proper preservation equipment
installed, the major tasks of reserve site personnel are those of
providing security and caretaker service. Aside from touring
the ships periodically to insure that equipment is functioning
within limits and applying a new coat of paint every two years
,
active inspection and preservation is negligible.
Although the ships are supposedly maintained in a manner
which will preserve them "as is" for an indefinite period,
without scheduled inspections, testing of machinery, electrical
circuits, and equipment, and corrective maintenance where need-
ed, deterioration beginning in secondary areas and eventually
spreading to primary areas is inevitable. This is especially
true considering the age of the Victory ships within the fleet.
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Although it was known that as these veterans aged they would
require more and more attention to assure continuation of their
response capability, such has not been the case. For better or
worse, these ships receive the same attention today (or lack of
it) that they received ten years ago.
The deterioration in the reserve fleet's material condition
has also been hastened by a pronounced lack of budgetary em-
phasis by MARAD. As indicated briefly in Chapter II (Table 1,
page 31 ) , the reserve fleet allocations over the past eight
years have been consistently less than one percent of the total
MARAD budget. This percentage provides an indication of the
priority afforded the reserve fleet in the allocation of re-
sources. With the increasing age of the Victory ships and con-
comitant increasing maintenance costs on the one hand and the
decreasing value of the dollar on the other, holding reserve
fleet funding constant has had an adverse effect on the ma-
terial condition of the NDRF.
Tasked by law with preserving the NDRF under the constraints
of an inadequate budget, the regional offices have been forced
to make several cutbacks in the area of reserve site personnel,
service, and facilities. This had made the accomplishment of
normal preservation work an extremely difficult effort. Con-
sequently, the material condition of the reserve ships has
been degraded in several areas.
In short, lack of proper funding has fostered a passive
preservation program in which reserve fleet ships have not
been maintained in a material condition conducive to timely
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activation, and unwarranted emphasis has been placed on scrap-
ping ships considered too costly to preserve.
D. REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS UPON ACTIVATION
An important consideration upon activation of the NDRF
will be compliance with the various rules, regulations, and
standards which govern U.S. maritime operations. Since de-
activation of the fleet in 1970, many federal requirements have
changed and new, more stringent statutory regulations have been
enacted. However, in keeping with MARAD policy, there has basic-
ally been no corresponding upgrading within the reserve fleet.
In fact, due to the discontinuance of the periodic inspections
and surveys required by the various maritime regulatory agencies,
certain essential qualifications have lapsed. Thus, unless
waivers are granted in large numbers, the time to activate the
NDRF will be lengthened by the time necessary to bring the ships
into compliance with current standards.
With respect to the foregoing, the three organizations
which would have the most effect upon the activation of the
reserve fleet are the U.S. Coast Guard, the American Bureau of
Shipping, and the Federal Communications Commission. Other
agencies such as the Public Health Service would play impor-
tant but less significant roles. (9:16) These agencies, their
regulations , and their impact upon the NDRF are examined in
this section.
The United States Coast Guard (USCG) is the principal mari-
time law enforcement agency of the Federal Government. As such,
its general areas of responsibility, as covered in the Code of
73

Federal Regulations (CFR) under Titles 33, 46, and 49, basically
entail ensuring that U.S. merchant ships can be safely operated
in the service and routes indicated and that subject ships com-
ply with all applicable laws, rules, and regulations.
To accomplish its mission, the Coast Guard has established
various compulsory inspection and survey requirements (indicated
in Table 13) . The principal inspection, the inspection for cer-
tification, consists of a visual as well as of an operational
examination of hull, machinery, lifesaving equipment, fire mains,
pollution prevention devices, and sanitation equipment. Once
this inspection has been accomplished and all noted discrepan-
cies satisfactorily corrected, a certificate of inspection is
issued by the cognizant Officer in Charge of Marine Inspection.
This certification by the Coast Guard's Office of Merchant Safety
is a mandatory requirement for all large U.S. merchant ships.
Additional Coast Guard inspections that are required to be car-
ried out at periodic intervals include drydocking, tailshaft
withdrawal, and an operational survey of cargo loading gear.
(9:53,22:1)
Concerning the NDRF , compliance with the Coast Guard inspec-
tion requirements, although time consuming and costly, would
require no major engineering changes. Noteworthy exceptions,
however, are the recent oil pollution prevention and marine
sanitation regulations (33 CFR 151-159) . These regulations
impact heavily upon the Victory ships of the reserve fleet
since these ships were constructed before increased emphasis
was placed on environmental protection standards and they are
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Inspection for 2 yrs.
certification
Reinspection or annual 10 to Ik General visual check
mos. after on inspection for
certifica- certification
tion









Tail shaft withdrawal 3 yrs. Can be extended under
special circumstances
but not more than one
additional year
Cargo gear k yrs. Requires complete
cargo gear load test
with winches, also
proof tests of equip-
ment. USCG requires





U.S. COAST GUARD INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS




not equipped to meet present standards. (9:21)
Although the Coast Guard may still issue a certificate of
inspection to a ship that is not in compliance with the pollu-
tion control regulations" (provided a notice of Merchant Marine
inspection requirements is issued and a waiver is requested and
granted) , the owners of the ship are not relieved of any liabil-
ity regarding the dumping of oil or sewage. (22:2) Accordingly,
even though strict compliance is not essential to NDRF breakout,
serious consideration must be given to the cost consequences of
these regulations if extended use of reserve ships is contem-
plated to support a contingency operation.
The federal oil pollution regulations, listed under Title
33 CFR, Sections 151-158, state that all ships constructed
prior to 1 July 1974 and operating within United States terri-
torial waters are required to have:
1) Capacity to retain on board all oily waste and
bilge slops that may accumulate while operating
in the navigable waters or contingeous zones.
2) For fuel discharge containment:
a) a fixed container or enclosed deck area of
at least two-barrels capacity under and
around each fuel tank vent, overflow and
fill pipe; or
b) a portable container at least 18 inches
deep which has at least a 5-gallon capa-
city under each fuel tank vent, overflow
and fill pipe; or
c) a flush deck fitting which is serviced by
an automatic back pressure shut off nozzle.
3) At least one pump installed to discharge oily
bilge slops or ballast through fixed pipe sys-
tem which shall have at least one standard dis-
charge outlet on each side of the weatherdeck.
4) Each such outlet will have a shore connection or
the vessel will have at least one portable adap-
ter that fits the outlets.
5) A means on the weatherdeck near the discharge to
stop each pump used to discharge oily waste and
a stop valve installed at each outlet.
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6) A placard that states: The Federal Water Pol-
lution Control Act prohibits the discharge of
oil or oily waste into or upon the navigable
waters and contingeous zone of the United States
if such discharge causes a film or sheen upon or
discoloration of, the surface of the water, or
causes a sludge or emulsion beneath the surface
of the water. Violators are subject to a penalty
of $5,000. (9:21)
However, these provisions are not applicable to any ship which
has a means to process oily bilge water which is acceptable to
the Coast Guard. Unfortunately, there is no acceptable unit or
process which can accommodate the large quantities anticipated.
Even if such a system were available, it would be extremely
expensive to install on a Victory ship. (9:22)
To meet the requirements of the oil pollution regulations,
the only means of compliance available for Victory ships is
the installation of a holding tank and pumping system. This
method was investigated by MARAD in 197 6 with regard to the
inclusion of Victory ships in the RRF. It was determined that
the requirements could be most expediently satisfied by convert-
ing the Victory's fuel and ballast center inner bottom tank
No. 3 for utilization as an oil and bilge slop tank. This
solution was considered viable in view of the fact that the No.
3 tank has a 160-ton capacity which is only approximately six
percent of a Victory ship's total fuel capacity (2,880 tons)
and thus would have a minimum downgrading effect on the ship's
maximum cruising radius.
Further, it was indicated that the waste could be pumped
via a cross connection with a stop valve between the bilge and
ballast pump and the fuel oil transfer pump and then pumped
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ashore through the main deck fuel fitting connections. The only
new installations required would be the shore connections , deck
fittings, and associated controls. (9:22)
The mandatory incorporation of Marine Sanitation Devices
(MSD) , as specified under Title 33 CRF Section 159, presents
another requirement which Victory ships are not equipped to meet.
Under existing regulations, mandatory compliance by Victory ships
has been waived until 30 January 1980. After that date, however,
it will be necessary to install a Type II or Type III MSD to
meet sanitation standards. The various approved Marine Sanita-
tion Devices are indicated below:
1) Type 1 - USCG certified overboard discharge to
1,000 fecal coliform per 100 milliliter plus
no visible floating solids standard;
2) Type II - USCG overboard discharge certified
to 200 fecal coliform per 100 milliliter plus
150 milligram to 1 total suspended solids
standard;
3) Type III - USCG certified to no-discharge
standard (i.e. , this can be a holding tank
with means to pump either shoreside or over-
board beyond 12-mile limit.) (9:23)
Considering the above, probably the least expensive means
of ensuring compliance with MSD standards would be to incor-
porate a Type III holding tank. Using USCG general criteria of
30 gallons per day per man with capacity for five days, a hold-
ing tank of approximately 1,000 cubic feet capacity would be
needed to meet the requirement. In view of the fact that only
toilet and urinal drains are required to be piped into a hold-
ing tank, the installation would be relatively simple. (9:23)
Since the current regulations allow for the operation of
Victory ships without MSD's until 1980, if the NDRF is reactiv-
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ated prior to this date the ships will be certified without
restriction. However, if the NDRF is called upon after 30
January 1980, resolution will require at least the submission
of waiver requests.
Concerning the impact of the aforementioned federal regula-
tions and safety standards on the reserve fleet, the Coast Guard
has indicated that in a total mobilization environment, where
the national defense is a primary concern, all inspection re-
quirements will be waived in order to put the necessary reserve
ships in service. However, the waiving of USCG certification
under a contingency situation is a more complicated matter. Es-
sentially, the Coast Guard's position is that a limited emergency
would not justify disregard of all legal requirements; moreover,
it would be prudent for MARAD to take such action as necessary
to bring reserve ships up to required standards and to ensure
Coast Guard inspection on an annual basis. Although current
regulations (46 CFR 90.05-1) specifically relieve all ships from
inspection requirements while laid up, compliance with such re-
quirements would prevent any serious delays during the reactiva-
tion process. (9:7,22:2-3)
The American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) is a private non-
profit ship classification society established to provide guid-
ance to marine insurance companies as to the quality of the
ships they are requested to insure. As such, the ABS has set




The areas examined by the ABS during classification are
reserve buoyancy as required by load line regulations, water
tight subdivision, communications and other equipment stipula-
tions, minimum standards as to quality, disposition, and di-
mensions of material used in ship construction, and regulations
concerning tonnage measurements. If a merchant ship meets the
Bureau's requirements in these areas it is granted classifica-
tion. (23:778)
ABS regulations stipulate, as a means of ensuring continued
compliance with Bureau standards, that classed ships undergo
extensive periodic surveys to retain classification. These re-
quirements, indicated in Table 14, are similar to those of the
Coast Guard but they are in most cases far more extensive. When
non-compliance with the survey requirements or due dates (Table
14) is determined immediate action is taken by the ABS to re-
voke classification. (9:53)
The importance of ship classification, aside from attesting
to a ship's material condition and seaworthiness, is indicated
by the four services it performs
:
1) It indicates on behalf of the owner that "due
diligence" was observed in the eventuality of
an accident;
2) it informs a prospective shipper that, by
sending his merchandise aboard, he is not
assuming a disproportionate amount of risk;
3) it assists the insurance underwriter in
ascertaining the nature of the risk involved; and
4) it enables the owner to obtain insurance at
normal prevailing rates. (9:18)
Thus, classification acts in the common interests of the owner,
the insurance underwriter, the shipper, and the public at large.
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TYPE OF INSPECTION INTERVAL OF
INSPECTION
COMMENTS
Special periodic survey k yrs.
Boiler/steampiping 4 yrs. Part of special
hydrostatic test periodic survey
Reinspection or annual 1 yr. General visual
check of hull and
machinery
Dry docking 2 yrs. Permits extension
of dry docking inter-
vals based on special
circumstances, ie.,
operation in fresh




Tail shaft withdrawal 3 yrs. Can be extended under
special circumstances,
but not more than one
additional year
Load line certificate 4 yrs. Delegated by Coast
Guard to ABS j check
for correct load
marks and also require
annual survey for en-
dorsement




AMERICAN BUREAU OF SHIPPING INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS




Concerning the NDRF, MARAD policy is not to maintain re-
serve ships (with the exception of the RRF) in "in class" status
while laid up. Consequently, if such status is desired the
ships will be delayed upon activation by the amount of time
necessary to meet ABS standards.
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is the third
principal agency whose rules and regulations will have a pro-
nounced effect upon the activation of the NDRF. When laid up
after Vietnam service, reserve ships were in full compliance
with the then current U.S. flag merchant ship radio communica-
tion requirements established by the FCC. However, since then
changes have been made in several of the Commission's regula-
tions with respect to mandatory communications equipment for
U.S. merchant ships, and the radio installations on board the
ships in the reserve fleet have not been changed to meet these
new requirements. (24:1) The requirements are contained in
subparts R, S, U, and X of the Federal Communications Com-
mission's Rules and Regulations (47 CFR 83:441 and 47 CFR
83.701-725). Essentially, these are as follows:
1) All vessels must have a current FCC-approved auto
alarm system aboard;
2) all vessels must have a current FCC-approved and
accepted reserve, main and high-frequency transmitter
aboard;
3) all vessels must have one emergency position indicat-
ing radio beacon (EPIRB) installed aboard;
4) all vessels must be equipped with an approved (USCG
and FCC) VHF/FM radio telephone system covering all
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U.S. and international frequencies as well as guard for
Channels 13 and 16 (Bridge to Bridge Safety Comm.); and
5) all AM radio telephone installations must be replaced
with an FCC-type accepted SSB radio telephone system
(effective 1 January 1977). (25:1)
Current planning by MARAD concerning NDRF contingency utiliza-
tion calls for reserve ships to be put in service with present
onboard radio communications systems intact. Although this will
meet the minimum operational requirements for ships sailing on
international voyages, it is recognized by MARAD that presently
installed communications systems may not meet the technical
standards or operational characteristics required by the afore-
mentioned FCC rules and regulations. (24:1) Concerning this
aspect, the FCC has indicated that MARAD may expect sympathetic
consideration of requests for temporary waivers to allow ships
to be put in service pending installation of equipment that
complies with FCC requirements.
However, the FCC has also indicated that many of its regula-
tions are simply the promulgation of statutory, treaty, or inter-
national agreements with respect to the safety of life at sea
which the FCC does not have the authority (under ordinary cir-
cumstances) to arbitrarily waive (e.g., the mandatory require-
ment to have a reliable communications system in operable con-
dition at sailing, etc.). The requirements are contained in
Parts II and II, of Title III, of the Communications Act (47
USC 351) ; the International Telecommunications Union (ITU)
Regulations; and the International Convention for Safety of
33

Life at Sea (SOLAS) agreements. (26:1-2)
The FCC has advised MARAD that it would be in its own best
interest to conduct a periodic review of the radio installations
on board all reserve fleet ships to determine compliance with
the legal requirements which could not be easily waived upon
emergency activation. The Commission further indicated that it
is highly desirable that all radio equipment meet these require-
ments even during periods when ships are in a reserve status.
(26:2)
E. PUBLIC VESSEL COMPLIANCE WITH REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS
The ships of the NDRF, as public vessels, are exempt from
most of the regulatory requirements discussed in the previous
section. However, it has been the policy of MARAD and MSC
during past reserve fleet activations to meet to the fullest
possible extent the requirements of cognizant regulatory
agencies. It is presumed that MARAD and MSC, as a means of
ensuring ship safety, will continue this policy.
F. SUPPLY SUPPORT
Another area of major concern regarding the activation of
the NDRF is the provision of spare parts. Since many replace-
ment equipments and components for Victory-class ships have
not been available commercially for years, MARAD' s principal
source of supply is its limited in-house inventory. If a
required piece of machinery, part, etc., is not available in
stock then it has to be specially manufactured in order to
complete repairs. This is an expensive and time-consuming
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operation. However, availability of a particular part is only-
half of the concern; knowledge of its availability, i.e., its
accessibility, is also important. The present decentralized
structure and management of MARAD ' s reserve fleet inventory
system is not conducive to accessibility. Therefore, it is
highly probable that spare parts shortages (through non-avail-
ability or inaccessibility) will seriously delay the deploy-
ment of reserve fleet units upon activation.
As alluded to in the previous paragraph, each reserve
fleet (James River, Suisun Bay, Beaumont) maintains its own
separate inventory of spare parts to support its assigned ships.
Each inventory, administered by regional personnel, is composed
of two elements
:
1) A general warehouse stock of major equipment and mach-
inery components which includes such items as steam
turbines, generators, booms, cargo winches, and the
like. These items are stored in barges and warehouses
under dehumidification protection.
2) A basic shipboard allowance of minor items necessary
for at-sea repairs. This inventory is stored aboard
reserve ships. (13:10-11)
Concerning the administration, maintenance, and general
status of the spare parts inventories at each reserve site, a
1976 General Accounting Office (GAO) report indicated that
while their inspection of warehouses and storage barges was
extremely positive (all listed equipment on hand and in good
condition) , corresponding checks of the spare parts allowance
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on randomly-selected ships were not so positive. In the latter
case, discrepancies included unlabeled, loose stock stored hap-
hazardly throughout the ship, lack of current physical inventory
counts, and in some instances inadequate records pertaining to
the actual spares required. In addition, the GAO report further
indicated that the amount of inventory on hand to support a
massive activation of reserve ships was critical in some areas.
(13:11)
Subsequent action by MARAD corrected most of the deficiencies
noted in the GAO report. Additionally, in an effort to increase
its support capability, MARAD has established a special holding
category within the reserve fleet composed of 44 recently-down-
graded Victory-class Troop ships (AP5's) to be cannibalized for
spare parts in the event of activation. (10:2) These ships are
currently in the James River and Suisun Bay fleets. However,
inventory still remains a critical issue.
Although availability has been addressed by MARAD, access-
ibility still poses a potential problem. Three separate inven-
tories, three separate inventory lists, three separate inventory
accounting systems, all add to the increased likelihood of
administrative failures in the event of massive fleet activation.
Although centralization of the three inventories is impractical,
a centralized automatic data processing system would alleviate
most accessibility problems by allowing access to the inventory
lists of the other fleets. Faced with limited resources, cen-
tralization of inventory data is the best way to ensure the
most effective and efficient use of available parts.
86

G. REPAIR FACILITY AND DRYDOCK CONSTRAINTS
The nation's ship repair industry is comprised of numerous
organizations of varying sizes and capabilities. The smaller
of these organizations, usually referred to as "topside" yards,
do not have drydocks, employ a limited number of people, some-
times less than 100, and specialize in work that can be ac-
complished without extensive ship facilities. (27:1230) Ap-
pendix G is a list of major topside repair facilities, 44 of
which are located on the East Coast. No attempt has been made
to tabulate specific machinery and equipment capabilities due
to variations in the type of work individual firms accomplish.
(28:39)
The larger organizations have drydocks and can repair or
rebuild any part of a ship. In the larger organizations, em-
ployment numbers in the thousands and repair may be combined
with shipbuilding capabilities. (27:1230) Of the industry's
250 firms that repair ships, 65 are capable of drydocking ships
300 feet or longer. For ships of this size, the repair indus-
try has a total of 128 drydocking facilities (73 floating dry-
docks, 50 graving drydocks, and 5 marine railways). (28:36)
These 65 major yards account for approximately 80 percent of
the total dollar value of the repair and conversion work within
the industry. (9:33,28:36)
9Presently, HARAD holds master repair contracts with 77
repair facilities. Geographically, these facilities are
9Master repair contract - an existing contractual instru-
ment which contains negotiated contract clauses to be used in
contracting for future repair services.
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distributed as follows: 38 on the East Coast, 18 on the Gulf
Coast, 20 on the West Coast, and 1 on the Great Lakes. (28:36)
Appendix H provides a summary of the drydocking facilities and
financial limitations for 74 of the 77 repair yards holding
master repair contracts.
Concerning the ability of the ship repair industry to re-
spond to the activation needs of the NDRF, it is important to
note that of the 65 major repair yards alluded to in the pre-
vious paragraph only 4 4 are capable of drydocking a Victory-
size ship. Correspondingly, the total number of drydocks
available is reduced from 128 to 84. (28:98) This is significant
in view of the fact that all NDRF Victory ships will require a
minimum three to five-day drydock period prior to being put in
service. A summary of repair yard capability by coast is in-
dicated in Table 15. Due to the extreme distance from each
reserve site, Great Lakes facilities would not be considered
practical during a contingency situation. Thus, as can be
seen in Table 15, the maximum number of repair yards with dry-
dock facilities that could be expected to be available is fur-
ther reduced to 39 (79 associated drydocks) . Appendix I tab-
ulates information as of 1977 for 30 of these yards on a coastal
basis.
Aside from the limited drydock resources available, another
important aspect to recognize is that in a non-mobilization
situation the prevailing attitude would be one of "business
as usual." NDRF ships would rate no special priority over
commercial business repairs other than that which could be
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Great Lakes D 8
TABLE 15
Number of Repair Yards Capable of
Drydocking Victory-Size Ships
*Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Report on Survey





obtained unofficially by the government. In this environment,
necessary ship repairs would have to be procured via normal
contract-bid procedures and MARAD would have to compete with
commercial interests for available space. Thus, in a contin-
gency requiring substantial activation of the reserve fleet,
a shortage of drydock space may develop into a serious bottle-
neck.
H. SEAGOING MANPOWER CONSTRAINTS
An area of considerable concern to DOD sealift planners is
the ability of the maritime industry to respond to the increased
demand for trained seagoing manpower in the event of a large-
scale breakout of NDRF ships. As indicated in Section B of this
chapter, during the Korean and Vietnam conflicts as more reserve
ships were activated, shortages of licensed deck/engineering
personnel and certificated radio operators proved more and more
acute (see Table 11, page 64 ). Thus, it would appear reason-
able to expect similar difficulties in the future. However,
MARAD has stated that no such difficulties are envisioned since
for every afloat position two qualified personnel are available,
and, in a contingency all available manpower would be utilized
to meet commitments. (19) It can be readily seen that there
are two divergent views on this subject.
In order to reach an independent conclusion as to what can
be expected in the area of manpower availability, a basic
assumption has been made that the maritime manpower pool is
related to seagoing opportunities. As can be seen below, sea-
going opportunities were far superior in the past to those
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predicted in the foreseeable future.
1) World War II (1940) - approximately 52,000 seagoing
positions.
2) Korea (1950) - approximately 57,000 positions (employ-
ment decreased from 189,000 in 1946 to 57,000 in 1950 -
over 700,000 seamen were issued USCG documents during
WWII)
.
3) Vietnam (1965) - Approximately 54,000 positions (by
1967, shipbound positions rose to 65,584).
4) 1977 - approximately 26,836 positions.
5) 1981 - between 22,000 and 29,000 seagoing positions.
(2:18)
Assuming the downward trend in seagoing positions continues,
the active manpower base available to support NDRF activation
and from which trained personnel would be withdrawn in an
emergency will shrink correspondingly.
The history of maritime employment opportunities has been
one of major expansion during periods of international conflict
and contraction in peacetime. The cyclical nature of the for-
tunes of the merchant marine have been expressed in numbers of
ships in the fleet and the associated job opportunities for
seamen. Manpower adjustments to meet fluctuations are diffi-
cult and tax the resources of private companies, maritime unions,
the Federal Government, and the seamen. As can be seen in
Table 16, in 1966 there were over 1,000 ships of 1,000 gross
tons or over in the privately-operated U.S. flag ocean-going




YEAR MERCHANT MARINE TOTAL SEAGOING TOTAL MANNING
(1,000 tons and over) BILLETS LEVEL
1964 919 54,312 103.000*
1965 949 54,853 101,000*
1966 1.093 60,245 95.208
1967 1,087 65.278 95.910
1968 1.033 62,285 117,923
1969 1.013 53.976 107,819
1970 819 47,034 87,463
1971 764 39.500 80,000
1972 633 32,333 77,123
1973 622 31,762 77,000
1974 594 28,697 74,000*
1977 577 26,831 71,000
TABLE 16
SIZE OF THE MERCHANT FLEET, 1964 - 1977
ourcG: National Academy of Sciences, The Seagoing
Workforce, Implications of Technological
*t- 4-i , j -at Change (29:53)Estimated Figures "- v ?**>j>
Jt-M-C 1
ships. Correspondina to this reduction in ships, by almost
50 percent, was a similar reduction in available jobs and a
decline in the size of the maritime workforce. (29:26,8:63)
The merchant marine is still experiencing a reduction in
the number of ships in the fleet and the number of jobs avail-
able for the workforce. Adding to this decline in employment
opportunities are reduced manning scales fostered by the
introduction of new technology, particularly automation. (29:63)
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This situation poses a dilemma because the need to attract
new, technically competent people into the merchant marine con-
flicts with the lack of employment opportunities caused by a
reduced number of jobs. The current workforce has a right to
jobs currently available, a right which is enforced by union
seniority regulations. In turn, within the current workforce,
those mariners with insufficient seniority are foreclosed from
obtaining enough employment and either leave the industry,
retire, or remain and receive a reduced income. The result is
an aging and imbalanced workforce with a potential for mass
retirement. As an example, almost half of today's deck and
engine officers are over 50 years old, a fact which indicates
their entry into the merchant marine as young men during World
War II. (30:2) As these older mariners begin to retire, a
shortage of experienced manpower in skilled areas will result.
It is this skill shortage that will pose a major challenge to
the future expansion of the maritime industry. (29:35)
This challenge prompted MARAD in 1969 to initiate the first
of a continuing series of studies aimed at forecasting the li-
censed manpower supply/demand situation which will exist in the
1980' s. To appreciate the uncertainty associated with these
forecasts, it should be noted that this first study concluded
that continuation of the then-existing union and federally-
sponsored deck and engine officer programs would perpetuate a
large trained manpower surplus which would prove detrimental to
the maritime industry as a whole. (30:3-5)
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The second study, published in 1972, forecast a significantly
lower "oversupply" than the first study. The third study, com-
pleted in 1974, forecast a continued decrease in the "over-
supply" of qualified deck and engine officers cumulating in a
shortage no later than mid-1977. The current study in the
series, Deck and Engine Officers in the U.S. Merchant Marine
,
Supply and Demand, 1976-1985 , after re-evaluating the previous
study's assumptions and applying sensitivity analyses to fleet
forecasts, concluded that a shortage in trained manpower is
indeed likely by the year 1981. (30:3-5)
In order to appreciate the potential impact of these fore-
cast shortages on the crewing of ships withdrawn for the reserve
fleet, it is necessary to quantify the increase in manpower
which will be demanded upon activation. .Depending on the nature
of, the expected duration of, and the amount of logistics sup-
port necessitated by a contingency, anywhere from 400 to over
5,500 mariners will be required to man and put in service the
RRF (9 ships) or the bulk of the NDRF (130 Victory ships) , res-
pectively. As can be seen in Table 17, assuming a crew of 44,
there will be a requirement for 1,040 deck/engine officers and
130 radio operators to man the 130 Victory ships currently in
the fleet. Stated simply, the licensed/certificated manpower




Thus far, this chapter has identified various material
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Cooks, stewards 9 1.170
TOTAL kk 5,720
TABLE 17
MANNING LEVEL BY SKILL CATEGORY FOR A VICTORY SHIP
Sources The Rand Corporation Report RM-3422-ISA, Federal
Maritime Policy and Military Shipping Requirements
,
by L.A. Rapping, p. 12, April 1963
significant effect upon the activation of the NDRF . An addi-
tional area of concern which has only recently presented itself
deals with the passage of the National Emergencies Act (Public
Law 94-412)
. The express purpose of this legislation was to
terminate the existing state of national emergency. Unfor-
tunately, it also terminated the authority to activate the NDRF.
(2:22)
As indicated in Chapter II, (page 19), the NDRF was estab-
lished under Section 11 of the Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946
which reads in part:
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A vessel placed in such reserve shall in no case
be used for any purpose whatsoever except that
any such vessel may be used for account of any
agency or department of the United States during
any period in which vessels may be requisitioned
under Section 902 of the Merchant Marine Act,
1936, as amended .... (31:1)
Of particular interest is the fact that this act provides for
the utilization of NDRF assets only during periods when com-
mercial ship requisitioning is imminent. According to Section
902 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, such periods are limited
to:
Whenever the President shall proclaim that the
security of the national defense makes it advis-
able or during any national emergency declared
by Proclamation of the President ... (30:1)
Thus, with the termination of the existing national emergency
went part of the authority to withdraw ships from the reserve
fleet.
The alternatives available to MARAD concerning the above
situation are:
1) When a contingency arises requiring NDRF activation,
petition the President to proclaim a state of national
emergency or declare the security of the national
defense is in jeopardy;
2) petition Congress to amend Section 11 of the Merchant
Ship Sales Act of 1946 to separate authority to acti-
vate the NDRF from authority to requisition; or
3) obtain an agreement between the Navy and MARAD to
allow interagency ship transfers per Section 717 of
the current DOD Appropriations Act.
96

It is considered that a Presidential declaration of a new state
of national emergency as required by the first alternative would
invite severe adverse publicity as would a proclamation concern-
ing the security of the national defense. As a consequence, a
contingency situation would have to reach the point of almost
full mobilization before such a declaration in either area would
be politically feasible.
Alternative two, changing the legislation to separate the
authority to withdraw ships from the reserve fleet from the
authority necessary to requisition commercial ships, is theo-
retically the best approach to the situation. However, consider-
ing legislative delays, it is probably not the most expedient.
Concerning alternative three, Section 717 of the current
DOD Appropriations Act authorizes the transfer of ships under
the jurisdiction of the Department of Commerce (DOC) to any
other federal department, without reimbursement, upon request
of the department and approval of DOC. Similar provisions
have been included in DOD appropriations bills since 1953 and
are presently codified under 4 USC 48 3a. (2:22) It is expected
that these provisions will continue to be included in future
DOD appropriations bills. Thus, it appears that under the
provisions of the appropriations bills sufficient authority
exists for the activation of NDRF ships, provided they are
placed in Navy custody for operation by MSC. However, it is
questionable that MARAD would consent to the transfer of re-
serve ships to the Navy unless an agreement was executed in
advance. (2:23) To date, no such agreement has been signed
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and the issue with regard to the authority to activate the
reserve fleet is still in question.
J . SUMMARY
Activation of the NDRF in response to past DOD requests
has exhibited substantial, but not insurmountable, problems.
Examination of these areas with respect to reserve fleet reli-
ability and availability reveals that crowded shipyards, short-
ages in qualified personnel, and inadequate spare parts supply
will have a significant impact on future activations. Addition-
ally, the material condition of the laid up ships will become a
more dominant factor as time passes.
In short, the constraints identified in this chapter imply
serious delays in the withdrawal and activation of reserve
shipping in a contingency situation. These delays are analyzed
in Chapter Four.

IV. ANALYSIS OF NDRF FUTURE ACTIVATION CAPABILITY
A. INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter various problem areas were identified
which would seriously retard the activation of the NDRF. The
purpose in this chapter is to analyze those areas with respect to
the delays which are the most likely to be experienced in res-
ponding to a future contingency.
In general, the emphasis placed on breakout time fluctuates
in response to the unique circumstances of each incident that
required employment of the NDRF. The degree of fluctuation is
proportional to the urgency of the situation. If demand is im-
mediate, activation time becomes an overriding consideration
and all shortcuts consistent with safety (limited sea trials,
maximum use of overtime and concurrent operations, etc.) are
taken. When breakout time is not a major consideration, an
orderly activation over a period of several months is possible.
Thus, depending on the situation involved, DOD time requirements
for NDRF breakout will vary. In order to estimate a future
activation rate and determine if the NDRF will be responsive
to DOD needs, a scenario has been developed to provide a vehicle
in which the various constraints on NDRF effectiveness can be
analyzed.
The scenario presented in the next section, although hypo-
thetical, is considered to be representative of the type of
contingency situation which might evolve in this country in
the 1980 's. It is necessary to select this fictitious method of
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presentation in order to be able to discuss military sealift
requirements in an unclassified format.
B. SCENARIO
The general scenario hypothesized involves a fast-breaking
contingency situation in which the United States is tasked with
supporting deployed U.S. forces while maintaining its commercial
trade. Within this environment, it is assumed that the with-
drawal of a large portion of the merchant marine from its trade
routes to meet the military requirement for increased lift capac-
ity would reap unacceptable economic penalties. Thus, the
requirement for sealift to support this military operation falls
for the most part on this country's reserve shipping capacity.
The specific situation hypothesized is described in the following
paragraphs.
On 5 June 1982, the last of the U.S. forces based in South
Korea are withdrawn. On 9 October of that same year, the North
Koreans launch a full-scale invasion of the South. In the wake
of this action, the President issues orders for the redeployment
of U.S. forces to stem the tide of this unprovoked offensive.
The U.S. forces utilized consist of a Modified Army Heavy
Armored Corps of 100,000 men with two-plus divisions and some
non-divisional tactical combat units. The main force units are
broken down as follows: a corps headquarters (with the atten-
dant battalions and companies of field artillery, air defense
artillery, etc.); an armored division; a mechanized infantry
division; an air cavalry brigade; an armored regiment and 15
tactical air squadrons. (32:4)
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All military forces and highly time-sensitive material are
airlifted to the scene of action. Troop movements commence
on 10 October and are completed by 30 October. The remainder of
the support equipment and necessary supply/resupply material
must be moved by sea.
The basic dry cargo sealift requirement to support a force
of corps size to sustain combat for 60 days is as follows:
1) Army
Unit equipment 712,460 measurement tons
Resupply 204,291 measurement tons
2) Air Force
Resupply 87,552 measurement tons
3) Total 1,004,303 measurement tons
As indicated, unit equipment comprises about 71 percent of the
total sealift requirement. These cargo items include: the
M-60 tank, helicopters (OH-58, AH-1, UH-1, and CH-47) ; trucks
(8-ton and 5-ton types) ; landing craft (LCM-6 and LCM-8) ; the
M-50 self-propelled 155 mm artillery piece; and the M-551 ar-
mored reconnaissance vehicle. (32:3)
Considering both the sealift requirement and the urgency
of the situation, the decision was made at MSC Headquarters to
utilize the SRP to augment MSC and RRF shipping assets. Sub-
sequently, a callup of SRP-committed shipping was initiated on
. 11 October. In response to this action, an immediate ground
Measurement ton (M/T) : A unit of cubic measurement equal
to 40 cubic feet.
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swell of opposition by participating shippers was experienced.
Many challenged the necessity of the callup in the courts contend-
ing that all reserve shipping (meaning the NDRF) should be com-
pletely exhausted prior to SRP involvement. Others rendered un-
willing compliance and stated it would require more time than
expected to notify the ships and have them proceed to ports of
embarcation. Due to the severe opposition, pending court de-
cisions, and the lack of time-responsive action by unwilling
shippers, the SRP was declared non-responsive to the callup on
13 October by MSC officials.
Thus, military sealift assets available for use during the
initial deployment of equipment and for subsequent resupply
operations are as follows (in priority)
:
1) MSC controlled fleet - (It is assumed that the 1982
MSC controlled fleet will be roughly comparable in size
to today's fleet.) This fleet consists of 3 roll-on/
roll-off s, 3 C-4 heavylift ships, 14 regular C-4s, 4
modified C-4 hulls and 3 other breakbulk ships (see
Appendix A). Of these ships, seven are available for
11 12immediate loading (ROS) with the remaining 20 (FOS)
available in 21 days. The ships at sea are directed to
discharge their cargo at the nearest port of opportunity
Reduced operating status (ROS) - Underutilized MSC ship-
ping maintained under SEP funding for readiness purposes
.
12
Full operating status (FOS) - Fully utilized MSC ship-





and proceed to their ports of embarcation by the quick-
est available routes. This fleet represents a lift
capacity of 44 3,523 measurement tons.
2) Ready Reserve Force - (It is assumed that by 1982 the
RRF will have reached its currently projected strength
of 25 ships.) This force is composed of the following
ship mix: 1 VC-2, 4 C-3s, 11 C-4s, and 9 Seatrains.
These ships are put on berth ready to accept cargo ten
days after notification. This fleet represents a total
lift capacity of 433,467 measurement tons.
3) NDRF Victory ships - (It is assumed that the size of this
fleet (129 ships) will remain constant through 1982.)
The time frame in which these ships are made available
is examined below. This fleet represents a total lift
capacity of 1,460,925 measurement tons.
Considering just the volume capacity needed (1,004,303 M/T)
and that which can be made available within three weeks
(876,990 M/T), it is apparent that a number of reserve Victory
ships have to be reactivated to supplement the sealift capability
of the MSC controlled fleet. Because the Victory-type ship is
not ideally suited for unit equipment cargoes (limited below-
deck stowage height, hatch size, boom capacity, etc.), these
ships are used in the resupply role. All unit equipment is
moved by RRF and MSC controlled fleet assets (C-4s, Ro/Ros,
Seatrains) . Thus, assuming a stowage factor of 80 percent,




Sealift operations commence on 12 October and initial sup-
ply is scheduled to be complete by 2 5 November. In order to
insure adequate sealift support of deployed U.S. forces, the
following time schedule was utilized by MSC:
7 MSC (ROS) ships available to load cargo on 12 October;
5 MSC (FOS) ships - the first turnaround segment - avail-
able on 15 October;
10 MSC (FOS) ships - the second turnaround segment - avail-
able on 20 October;
25 RRF ships available on 24 October;
10 MSC (FOS) ships - the last turnaround segment - avail-
able on 25 October;
33 NDRF Victory ships available on 10 November.
With the exception of the 3 3 Victory ships, the above sea-
lift operations went as scheduled: The Victory ships which were
to constitute the resupply segment of the operation were not
available due to numerous unforeseen difficulties experienced
during their reactivation.
The two cases that follow, termed optimistic and pessi-
mistic, were predicated on two combinations of conceivable
conditions which would affect the availability of the NDRF in
the scenario described above.
C. OPTIMISTIC CASE
This case portrays the most favorable circumstances that
can reasonably be expected during future activation efforts.
It assumes the following general conditions:
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1) Immediate availability of drydocks and repair facilities
in the vicinity of each reserve site;
2) adequate shipyard manpower skills to handle the increased
repair activity;
3) material condition of reserve fleet such as to require
only minimum hull and topside repairs; and
4) sufficient maritime manpower in the licensed certifica-
ted skill areas (deck, engine, radio) to meet the in-
creased demand.
Considering the hypothetical scenario presented in the pre-
vious section, it is assumed that a minimum of four days would
be lost to the administrative decision process. Assuming maxi-
mum utilization of concurrent decision steps (see Figure 7,
page 52 ) , it would be 14 October before any decision could be
made to employ MDRF Victories to supplement contingency ship-
ping and before the MARAD regional directors would receive in-
structions to start breaking out reserve ships. At that time,
repair facilities would be canvassed, drydock reservations
would be made, fleet superintendents would be notified, and
general agents would be solicited (see Figure 10) . The activa-
tion estimates in this and the following case are based on the
14 October date as being considered time zero.
To be responsive to the time requirement established by
DOD (ships on berth within 30 days) , activation will have to
proceed on a "crash" basis. As such, drydock and repair facili-
ties will be procured by negotiated instead of competitive
means. Although this action is more costly, it has the poten-
























































































estimated that drvdock and repair services could be contracted
for in one day.
The repair industry situation considered in this case is
one offering minimum constraint to NDRF activation. It is
estimated that between 30 and 50 percent of drydock space and
80 percent of repair yard space (topside yards) could be made
available for immediate VC-2/3 utilization. Since there is
usually a two-year backlog in new ship construction, shipyard
facilities are not considered available for NDRF use. Addi-
tionally, it is estimated that 4 percent of the manpower re-
sources at each yard could be devoted to the activation effort.
This situation is summarized in Table 18, which takes into
account commercial demand for repair and conversion.
It is assumed that ships being broken out will be towed to
nearby drydocks and then towed to topside yards in the same
general vicinity. It is estimated that it will require two
days for breakout and towing operations and five days at the
drydock facility itself, assuming no unforeseen hull repairs.
In the optimistic case, it is postulated that the material
condition of the reserve fleet in 1982 will be such as to re-
quire an average of 35,000 man-hours per ship for repair and
refit. This figure is predicted by assuming minimum deteriora-
1
tion in secondary areas (electrical wiring, electronic equipment,
boilers, etc.), minimum deck replating, and minimum setbacks
due to scarcity of spare parts. It is estimated, making maxi-
mum use of overtime labor, that each Victory will require an
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predicated on the assumption that in 1982 there will exist an
adequate pool of skilled labor to support around-the-clock
shifts.
The repair yard estimate also includes time allotted to
ensure compliance with all regulatory requirements. Waivers
would be considered only in those cases where inordinate costs
or delays would be encountered (i.e., oil pollution/marine
sanitation regulations, FCC regulations concerning specific
radio operating characteristics) . It is anticipated, that due
to the urgency of the situation, all regulatory agencies (USCG,
ABS, FCC) will be sympathetic to waiver requests where safety
of life at sea is not involved.
In order to maximize use of concurrent activation steps,
outfitting (furnishing stores, providing habitability items,
installing and inventoring all navigation, office, berthing
equipment, etc.) will take place at the same time as repair
activities. It is anticipated that minimum difficulty will be
experienced in obtaining these items.
Upon completion of topside repairs and refitting, sea trials
will be performed enroute to designated ports of embarcation
and will be of minimum duration (two days)
.
The Gantt chart in Figure 11 illustrates the time-phased
activation schedule under the above optimistic assumptions.
As can be seen, it will require a minimum of 39 days after
notification to break out and put in service the first round
of Victory ships. Thus, the earliest that DOD could expect

























































































































Considering the previous estimates as the best case with
regard to reserve fleet time responsiveness, Table 19 projects
the breakout schedule by coast for the remainder of the fleet
(assuming an escalation in the contingency and more shipping
required) . Utilizing a sustained activation rate of 27 ships
every 15 days, it would require 114 days working around the
clock, 7 days a week, with minimum delays to deploy the entire
fleet.
The activation times described thus far have not included
delays due to crew shortages. Naturally, difficulty in this
area could increase the above estimates. However, as indicated
earlier, in the optimistic case manning is not perceived to be
a problem.
D. PESSIMISTIC CASE
In the pessimistic case, activation times are slower than
in the previous case but they are in keeping with potential
shipyard and ship repair constraints. In the pessimistic case,
it is assumed that the following conditions prevail:
1) Delays in drydock availability occur due to commercial
backlogs;
2) shipyard skilled labor pools are inadequate to accom-
modate surges in repair activity;
3) material condition of the reserve fleet is such as to
warrant extensive hull and topside repairs; and
4) manpower shortages exist in the licensed deck, engine,
and radio skill areas.
Ill

14 OCT •82 ATLANTIC GULF PACIFIC TOTAL CUMULATIVE
23 Nov '82 12 4 11 27 27
8 Dec '82 12 5 12 29 56
23 Dec •82 12 4 12 28 84
7 Jan '83 9 4 12 26 110
22 Jan '83 - 4 11 15 125
6 Feb •83 - 4 - 4 129
TOTAL 45 25 59 129 -
TABLE 19
Activation of 129 Victory Ships Under Optimistic Conditions
'Sources GAO Report, The National Defense Reserve Fleet -




As in the optimistic case, activation period estimates start
at the time each regional director receives notification of
the requirement (14 October) . The administrative decision
steps taken prior to this point are assumed (as in the optimis-
tic case) to require a minimum of four days to complete.
The repair industry situation anticipated under pessimistic
assumptions is one of intensive commercial utilization. Thus,
assuming no bumping of ships already scheduled, it is estimated
that a minimum of seven days' delay in obtaining drydock space
will be encountered. This is the time necessary to integrate
Victory ships into the regular commercial schedule and to com-
plete work already in progress. After this initial delay, it
is anticipated that drydock services will gradually become
available up to the level experienced in the optimistic case.
In general, a "business as usual" attitude would prevail through-
)ut the industry and activation efforts would receive essentially
10 special consideration in terms of manpower allocations or
irydock space.
Under these circumstances, activation of the NDRF would be
seriously constrained. One means of minimizing the drydock
bottleneck which would ensue would be to reverse-schedule dry-
dock and topside repairs. Considering that drydock facilities
would be unavailable for at least seven days, commencement of
topside maintenance for the first group of Victories broken out
of layup would be an expeditious course of action. Presumably,
when the second group of Victories was broken out drydock facili-
ties would be available.
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It is anticipated, considering the time factors involved
and the industry situation, that repair and drydock services
would again be procured on a negotiated vice competitive bid
basis. It is assumed that competitive bid awards would be
considered when cost and not time was the major factor. It is
estimated that drydocking once attained would require eight
days to complete. In the pessimistic case three additional
days are arbitrarily added to accomplish the more extensive
hull maintenance and repairs (sand blasting, repainting, repair-
ing damaged plates) that are expected. (Without actually breaking
out ships a reliable estimate of drydocking time requirements
cannot be obtained.)
Under pessimistic assumptions, the material condition of
the reserve fleet in 198 2 is considered to be such as to require
a minimum of 65 days (an average of 45,000 man-hours per ship)
in order to effect topside repairs. This estimate takes into
account extensive deck rewiring, replacement of damaged, eroded
deck plates, and machinery overhauls.
Other items that would contribute to a lengthy repair period
would be maximum delays due to the necessity of manufacturing
critical spare parts not in inventory and a shortage of labor in
such skill areas as welders, electricians, machinists, and pipe-
) fitters. It is postulated that repair yards can accommodate a
gradual buildup of demand that requires doubling the normal
repair yard labor force. Such a buildup would permit an orderly
assimilation of unskilled laborers. Each skilled worker would
be assigned a newly-hired helper or in some instances, a skilled,
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experienced employee would guide the work of several newly-
hired, inexperienced workers. In other words, skill shortages
could be compensated for, but only gradually. Obviously this
buildup would be of little benefit to the first group of ships
activated.
As in the optimistic case, certification, loadline, and
other regulatory inspections would occur concurrently with dry-
dock and topside maintenance. However, due to the degraded
material condition of the fleet in the pessimistic situation,
it is anticipated that compliance with the basic requirements
will be time consuming and subject to numerous delays. Short-
age of inspection personnel, reluctance to issue waivers on the
part of the agencies, and reinspection in many .critical areas,
all would contribute to extending the activation process. It
is expected that if compliance becomes too time consuming, many
of the requirements will have to be conscientiously ignored.
As indicated in the Gantt chart in Figure 12, activation
of the initial group of Victories under the combination of ad-
verse conditions described in the previous paragraphs will re-
quire approximately 82 days. Thus if the MARAD regions are
notified on 14 October as to the number of ships required, the
first ship will not be available until 4 January. This is assum-
ing, of course, that sea trials are passed with no major diffi-
culty. Using this date as a base, Table 20 indicates the expec-
ted time frame for deployment of the remainder of the fleet















































































































































14 OCT •82 ATLANTIC GULF PACIFIC TOTAL CUMULATIVE
4 Jan '83 7 4 5 16 16
4 Feb •83 7 4 5 16 32
4 Mar •83 9 5 7 21 53
4 Apr '83 9 5 7 21 74
4 May •83 10 5 9 24 98
4 jun •83 3 2 9 14 11 2
4 Jul •83 - - 9 9 122
4 Aug •83 - - 8 8 129
TOTAL 45 25 59 129 -
TABLE 20
Activation of 129 Victory Ships Under Pessimistic Conditions
*Sourcei GAO Report, The National Defense Reserve Fleet -
Can It Respond to Future Contingencies ? (13« 30)
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The above activation estimates are based entirely upon the
time required to break out ships from layup and do not allow
for delays due to crew shortages in such areas as licensed deck,
engine, and radio. Under the foregoing assumptions, it is
anticipated that the first 30 Victory ships activated will not
experience crewing difficulties due primarily to the long lead
time involved. Approximately three months would exist in which
to identify shortages, recruit skills from the labor market,
accelerate training programs, and reallocate manpower resources
prior to the first group of ships becoming available. However,
subsequent activations would be subject to delays and short-
handed sailings until the industry's training and licensing
program could accommodate the increased demand.
' E. CONCLUSION
The two cases outlined in the preceding sections are con-
sidered representative of both ends of the spectrum with regard
to future reserve fleet responsiveness in a contingency situa-
tion. In comparing the activation estimates it is concluded
that the NDRF's ability to provide supplemental reserve ship-
ping within the time frame specified in the scenario is non-
existent. Even under the best of circumstances, the earliest
that reserve ships can be available is 23 November. This is
assuming that no constraints other than the material condition
of the ships will prevail. Such clearly may not be the case.
In analyzing the scenario developed in this chapter, it is
surmised that reserve ships will be ready for service sometime
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between 23 November 1982 and 4 January 1983 assuming that break-
out notification is received by 14 October. Since the scenario
mandates that resupply operations commence no later than 10
November, the NDRF cannot be considered responsive to the con-
tingency situation postulated. This analysis demonstrates that
during a contingency situation, commercial shipping will have
to be withdrawn temporarily for military use until adequate
reserve shipping becomes available.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
In this thesis, numerous problem areas which could constrain
the response capability of the NDRF have been examined. The
most serious of these is the present material condition of the
130 Victory ships maintained in the fleet. With the exception
of the nine ships assigned to the Ready Reserve Force, the ships
of the NDRF are not maintained in a condition conducive to either
rapid or economical reactivation. Lack of proper equipment,
facilities, and personnel; lack of adequate funding; and a pre-
servation program directed towards maintaining the "status quo"
are all contributing factors to the poor material condition of
the reserve fleet. Due to this poor material condition, it is
estimated that an average of 40,000 man-hours per ship will be
required to fully service a reserve ship and make it ready for
sea. The corresponding maintenance period will be the dominant
factor in determining the time frame in which these ships can be
made available to DOD in an emergency.
Considering the present material condition of the NDRF ships
upon activation, compliance with the various rules, regulations,
and standards which govern U.S. maritime operations would also
be a constraining factor. Although waivers could be obtained,
in a non-emergency situation the Coast Guard and FCC have stated
reluctance to waive legal requirements, especially where safety
of life at sea is involved. Additionally, compliance would be
in the best interest of MARAD since willful non-compliance may
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have an adverse effect on crewing the ships. Thus, upon activa-
tion, additional time may have to be allotted for the inspection
and certification of ships.
The majority of the ships in the NDRF will have to undergo
a drydock period prior to being put in service. As the analy-
sis has indicated, the availability of drydocks is a critical
issue if a substantial number of reserve ships are to be
activated. Depending upon the intensity of the commercial ac-
tivity within the repair industry, drydocking could become a
serious bottleneck to activation efforts.
Even if reserve ships can be activated in a reasonable time
frame, the ability to crew such ships poses a potential problem.
Manning difficulties will depend to a great extent on the num-
ber of active positions and the number of inactive mariners
seeking seagoing positions. It is anticipated that the seamen
who became surplus to the needs of the merchant marine at the
end of the Vietnam War will no longer be in the maritime labor
force in the 1980 's.
Additionally, most of the mariners who entered the merchant
marine during World War II will have long since retired. Ac-
cordingly, if the reserve fleet is activated, crews will neces-
sarily have to be recruited from the various maritime academies,
from those retired, from those on vacation, as well as from
those expected to be in the inactive labor force.
In general, it is expected that in the foreseeable future
the maritime industry will possess a surge labor capacity suf-
ficient to man the ships in the RRF. However, due to fore-
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casted shortages of trained personnel to meet commercial re-
quirements in the early 1980' s, there is considerable uncertainty
with regard to the ability of the industry to crew ships in ad-
dition to the RRF in a contingency situation.
In view of the constraints identified above and the asso-
ciated delays, it is concluded that the capability of the NDRF
to provide reserve shipping within the first 30 days of a con-
tingency callup in the 1980' s is inadequate. Thus, if a situation
arose requiring sealift support beyond the limited capacity of
MSC and RRF assets, DOD would have to divert commercial shipping
to military service until the NDRF became available.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The disruption of this country's maritime trade in the above
fashion is acceptable only when national security is threatened.
The recommendations that follow are directed towards reestablish-
ing the. NDRF in its position as a buffer between surge DOD sea-
lift requirements and the necessity of utilizing commercial
shipping.
It is recommended that the NDRF funding level be increased
to allow reserve fleet superintendents to pursue a more aggres-
sive preservation program to include regular inspections, opera-
tion of equipment, and necessary repair maintenance. In this
manner, the actual material condition of reserve ships can be
ascertained on a continuing basis. This would facilitate ac-




It is recommended that critical replacement parts not in
inventory and potential sources of supply be identified so as
to be readily available upon activation. Additionally, it is
recommended that the three separate reserve fleet inventories
be combined under one computerized central control system.
It is recommended that a long-range plan for phase out and
replacement of NDRF Victory ships be initiated. One proposal
that is worth further investigation is that of replacing the
aging Victories with government-subsidized newly-constructed
breakbulk ships. These ships once built could be employed in
various tramp operations throughout the world with the under-
standing that they would be made immediately available upon
request by DOD. The benefits of this "reserve fleet at sea
concept" is that it would promote maritime employment, it would
insure the availability of a fully-manned and ready ship within
10 to 20 days of callup, and it would insure that the valuable
(from a military standpoint) breakbulk ships would not disappear
from the U.S. flag inventory.
In conclusion, it is recommended that further research with
respect to activation of the NDRF be conducted in the area of
qualified manpower availability. Some type of manpower reactiva-
tion plan needs to be devised which would encompass the identi-





Excerpted from Ref. 2
NUCLEUS TYPE YR. BUILT SPEED M/T
METEOR RO/RO 67 20.0 24,279
COMET RO/RO 58 18.0 17,096
MIRFAK C-l 57 13.0 2,651
BLAND C-3 51 18.5 13,222
TOWLE VC-2 45 16.5 10,446
BROSTROM C-4 (H/L) 43 17.0 16,985
CHARTERED SHIPS
CALLAGHAN RO/RO 67 25.0 50,044
AMER RELIANCE C-4 65 21.0 15,800
AMER RANGER C-4 65 21.0 15,450
AMER RACER C-4 64 21.0 15,800
AMER CHAMPION C-4 63 21.0 15,400
AMER CHIEFTAIN C-4 63 21.0 15,400
AMER COURIER C-4 63 21.0 15,400
AMER CORSAIR C-4 63 21.0 15,400
PION CONTENDER C-4 63 21.0 15,400
PION COMMANDER C-4 63 21.0 15,400
PION CRUSADER C-4 63 21.0 15,400
PION CONTRACTOR C-4 63 21.0 15,400
PION MOON C-4 62 21.0 15,400
AMER CHARGER C-4 62 21.0 15,400
AMER CHALLENGER C-4 62 21.0 15,400
TRANSCOLORADO C-4 (H/L) 45 17.0 16,552
TRANSCOLUMBIA C-4 (H/L) 45 17.0 16,552
GREEN SPRING EX C-4 (MOD) 45 17.0 18,874
GREEN WAVE EX C-4 (MOD) 45 17.0 18,874
GREEN LAKE EX C-4 (MOD) 44 17.0 18,874





U.S. FLAG GENERAL CARGO FLEET
Excerpted from Ref. 2.







517 525 544 515 483 415 336 246 200 160
21 29 31 72 107 105 113 106 104 113
----- 167 10 13
------- 2331112 358 9 10 12








75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85
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113 108 105 105 105 105 105 108 111 113 117
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NDRF STATUS AS OF JUNE 30, 1978



































































































































































INITIAL BREAKDOWN COST OF FIRST 4 7 VICTORY SHIPS
ACTIVATED FOR VIETNAM SERVICE








































































































CONDITION STATUS OF 130 VICTORY SHIPS IN NDRF





ANNUAL LAST CARGO GEAR OUTSTANDING
SURVEY DUE DRYDOCK QUAD SURVEY WORK
Albion
Victory 5/70 12/70 8/70 None noted
Anchorage
Victory 5/70 5/70 N/A • Hull dmg
Bessemer
Victory 6/70 6/69 9/70 Hull dmg
Bearing dmg
Brigham
Victory 11/70 2/71 11/73 None noted
Britain
Victory 5/70 8/68 8/69 None noted
< Burbank
Victory 9/69 9/68 8/70 None noted
Clarksville
Victory 1/69 1/68 12/70 Elec. cable
dmg
Cornell
Victory 5/69 9/68 5/74 Hull dmg
CCNY
Victory 3/69 3/68 1/70 None noted
Denison
Victory 1/71 4/69 1/74 None noted
Drury
Victory 4/70 1/70 10/69 None noted
Durango




Victory 4/70 6/70 2/70 HP & LP Pin
on Gear dmg
Halaula
Victory 1/70 10/70 2/70 #2 Gen. Exam
Harvard
Victory 4/70 8/70 1/70 None noted
Hobart





ANNUAL LAST CARGO GEAR OUTSTANDING
















































































4/70 Flat keel dmg
9/70 Flat keel dmg









































































































ANNUAL LAST CARGO GEAR OUTSTANDING




Victory 7/70 7/69 8/70 Relays & Cir-
cuit Breakers
Enid
Victory 2/70 9/69 2/70 FK pits 16 &
17 renewal
Grinnell
Victory 1/70 9/68 1/70 Rotor #1 Gen.
High Point
Victory 6/70 9/68 8/70 Hull dmg
Linfield N/A N/A N/A N/A
Meridian
Victory 11/69 8/68 7/73 None noted
Pine Bluff
Victory 10/69 10/68 9/69 H.P. Turbine
Rotor Repairs
San Mateo
Victory 10/69 10/68 10/69 Hull dmg
Tucson
Victory 2/70 11/68 4/70 Mn Red. Gears
(exam)
Whittier
Victory 5/70 4/69 2/70 Hull dmg
Asbury





Victory 4/70 4/69 9/69 None noted
Gainesville
Victory 7/70 7/69 N/A None noted
Hattiesburg
Victory 5/70 5/67 2/70 None noted
Minot
Victory 1/70 1/69 1/70 None noted
Princeton








ANNUAL LAST CARGO GEAR OUTSTANDING




Victory 8/69 2/69 N/A None noted
Barnard
Victory 8/69 2/69 N/A None noted
Barre




Victory 12/69 5/68 N/A None noted
Berkley
Victory 10/69 10/68 9/69 None noted
Boulder
Victory 4/54 4/53 N/A None noted
Bowdoin
Victory 2/69 2/68 2/70 None noted
Brazil
Victory 5/69 5/68 8/69 None noted
Carleton
Victory 10/53 9/53 N/A None noted
Central
Victory 6/69 6/68 7/70 None noted
Clarksville
Victory 8/70 N/A N/A Shell drng
Clearwater
Victory 10/69 4/68 8/70 Shell dmg
Creighton
Victory 1/70 10/68 8/73 None noted
De Peuw
Victory 10/69 10/68 N/A None noted
Earlham
Victory 5/70 5/69 9/70 None noted
Fenn
Victory 12/69 12/68 1/70 None noted
Frontenac
Victory 10/69 10/68 10/70 None noted
Great Falls
Victory 5/70 5/69 1/70 None noted
Grove City
Victory 7/69 7/68 8/69 Bilge keel
dmg
Hope







LAST CARGO GEAR OUTSTANDING















































































































































































MAJOR TOPSIDE REPAIR FACILITIES




American Ship Repairs Co., Inc.
Brooklyn, N.Y.
Arnessen Electric Company, Inc.
Brooklyn, N.Y.
Atlantic Marine, Inc.
Fort George Island, Fla.
Atlantic Repair Co., Inc.
Brooklyn, N.Y.
Auto Marine Sales Corp.
Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.
Banks Ship Rigging Corp.
Brooklyn, N.Y.




Caddell Drydock & Repair Co.
Staten Island, N.Y.
Cardinal Engine & Boiler Works,
Inc., Brooklyn, N.Y.




Diesel Injection Sales &
Service, Norfolk, Va.
Electric Motor & Contracting Co.
Norfolk, Va.
General Ship Repair & Engine
Works, Inc., E. Boston, Mass.
General Ship Repair Corp.
Baltimore, Md.
Home Brothers, Inc.








Kurt's Marine Diesel, Inc.
Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.








A. Moe & Co. , Inc.
Philadelphia, Pa.




EAST COAST GULF COAST
Newport Shipyard, Inc.
Newport, R.I.



















Surless Ship Repair Corp.
Brooklyn , N.Y.
Thames Shipyard & Repair Co.
New London, Conn.
Tickle Engineering Works, Inc.
Brooklyn, N.Y.
Williams Brothers
Division of Gowen, Inc.
Portland, Me.
Williams & Manchester Shipyard
Newport, R.I.
Wilmington Iron Works, Inc.






Boland Marine and Mfg. Co.
New Orleans, La.
Buck Kreihs Co., Inc.
New Orleans, La.
Coastal Iron Works, Inc.
Corpus Christi, Tex.
Coastal Marine Service of Texas,
Inc., Port Arthur, Tex.
Dixie Machine Welding & Metal
Works, New Orleans, La.
Farmer ' s Marine Copper Works
,
Inc., Galveston, Tex.








Lone Star Marine Salvage Co.
Houston, Tex.














Slocum Iron Works, Inc.
Mobile, Ala.
Pacific Drydock & Repair Co,
Oakland, Calif.

















Dockside Machine & Ship Repair
Wilmington, Calif.











Ets-Hokin & Galvan Electric Co.
San Diego, Calif.








General Eng. & Machine Works
San Francisco, Calif.
GREAT LAKES




Marine Iron Works, Shipyard
Div. , Tacoma, Wash.




Hans Hansen Welding Co., Inc.
Toledo, Ohio







Nicholson & Hall Corp.
Buffalo, N.Y.
Nicholson Terminal & Dock Co.
River Rouge, Mich.









Sault Ste. Marie, Mich.
William Farrel, Inc.
Toledo, Ohio
Ste. Marie Yard & Marine, Inc,




SHIPYARDS HOLDING MASTER REPAIR CONTRACTS



























INDUSTRIAL WELDING & MACHINE CO.,
Portland, Maine
































































NORDIC DIESEL & MACHINE CO., INC.,
Brooklyn, N.Y.







MARYLAND SHIPBUILDING & DRYDOCK CO.,
Baltimore, Md. Yes
SUN SHIPBUILDING & DRYDOCK CO.,
Chester, Pa. Yes




























Norfolk and South Atlantic Area -










































TAMPA SHIP REPAIR & DRYDOCK CO., INC.,
























ALABAMA DRYDOCK & SHIPBUILDING CO.,
Mobile, Ala.
BENDER WELDING & MACHINE CO., INC.,
Mobile, Ala.
SLOCUM IRON WORKS, INC.,
Mobile, Ala.
Mississippi -







AVONDALE SHIPYARDS, INC. •
New Orleans, La.






BUCK KREIHS CO., INC.
New Orleans, La.





















































COASTAL MARINE SERVICE OF TEXAS, INC.
Port Arthur, Tex.




HARRISBURG MACHINE CO., INC.
Houston, Tex.
Western Region:















































San Francisco Bay Area -
WILLAMETTE IRON & STEEL CO.









Columbia River Area -












NORTHWEST MARINE IRON WORKS,
Portland, Ore.




























Name & Location Drydock Financial
of Contractor Facilities Limitation
Western Region:
State of Hawaii -
DILLINGHAM SHIPYARD
(a DIVISION OF DILLINGHAM CORP.)
Honolulu, Hawaii - Unlimited
PACIFIC MARINE & SUPPLY CO., LTD.,





Excerpted from Ref. 28.










Ira S . Bushey
Brooklyn, N.Y.






Maryland S.B. & D.C. Co.
Newport News SB & DD Co.
Newport News, Va.
Norfolk SB & DD Corp.
Norfolk, Va.
Savannah Mach. & DD Co.
Savannah, Georgia

























Ship Repair Yard No. of Drydocks Current Mobilization
(1977)
GULF COAST
Alabama DD & SB Co.
Mobile, Ala. 2 3,430 29,000
Bethlehem Steel
Beaumont, Tex. 1 1,240 5,100
Tampa Ship Repair
Tampa, Fla. 1 640 1,100
Todd Shipyards
Galveston, Tex. 1 817 4,000
Todd Shipyards
Houston, Tex. 1 300 2,175
Todd Shipyards
New Orleans, La. 2 370 2,500
Avondale Shipyards, Inc.
New Orleans, La. 1* 6,900 N/A
WEST COAST
Bethlehem Steel
San Francisco, Calif. 2
Bethlehem Steel
Term. Island, Calif. 2
Lockheed SB & Const. Co.
Seattle, Wash. 2*
National Steel & SB Co.


























Willamette Iron & Steel
Richmond, Calif. 5 350 2,170
* Yard has additional drydock(s) not large enough to accommodate
a Victory ship. Employment data, however, are for the entire
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